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About this Pappas is right: it is important not to forget that the effort to realize an autochthonous Latino/a philosophy can undermine itself by becoming too ideological and thus un-philosophical. But, if the symposium proved anything, it showed that having a cultural or political agenda in philosophy is not incompatible with doing philosophy well. What the possibility of Latino/a philosophy can teach us is that the self-referential nature of philosophy might include ethnic identity as one more relevant difference within philosophy—alongside gender, for example—and that the problem of marginalization in philosophy is a philosophical problem in need of a solution, not just a sociological or administrative problem. And while it’s true that a philosophy whose only aim is to achieve some political agenda is not philosophy, what all the speakers demonstrated throughout the symposium is that having an agenda doesn’t necessarily compromise the aspiration to universality or dull the critical edge, which, more than anything, distinguishes philosophy from other disciplines. The symposium was ultimately an opportunity to hear from great philosophers who happen to be Latino/a, and the excellence of whose work was in no way compromised by the awareness that our coming together was a major moment in the process of defining Latino/a philosophy.

NOTES
1. All quotes are from drafts of the papers presented at the symposium unless otherwise specified.

2. One question to ask is whether ethnic differences matter to philosophical truth. To answer this question, though, we should be able to say what an ethnicity is—what distinguishes it, for instance, from race—and what philosophy is. Further, the phrase “Latino/a philosophy” suggests that we can define “Latino/a”—is it an ethnic or racial identity? One or a cluster of identities? A meaningful identity in Latin America or just in the United States?—and, as we have seen in the previous two paragraphs, that we can or should distinguish it from “Latin American,” “Hispanic,” or, say, “Mexican-American” or “Chicano.”

3. Vargas adds that the situation is much worse for Latinos/as born in the United States and that “anecdotal data suggests that a non-trivial percentage of Latinos in the APA data are foreign-born nationals who do not identify as Latino.” The data from the APA are from February 2013.

4. Again, the numbers are misleading, since they don’t highlight that there are more than twenty-eight cities—defined as cities of more than 100,000 people—in the United States with majority Latino populations, or that 40 percent of California is Latino/a. In other words, the data don’t quite capture the degree of underrepresentation in certain regions.

5. Alcoff offered this phrase first in her presidential address to the Eastern Division of the APA in December 2012. The address can be heard at http://alcoff.com/2012-american-philosophical-association-presidential-address.

6. In support of Schutte’s claim that philosophy does not work in isolation from the rest of our social practices, Mendieta would add that “[s]ociety in general has become cynical and skeptical of identity-claims, especially when these are supposed to entitle the claimant to some sort of social benefit.” See Eduardo Mendieta, “The Second Reconquista, or Why Should a ‘Hispanic’ Become a Philosopher?” Philosophy and Social Criticism 27, no. 11 (2001): 14.


8. To illustrate how recognizing group differences leads to internal exclusions, Ortega cites a famous Supreme Court case, DeGraffenreid vs. General Motors, in which a group of black women sued General Motors for discriminatory practices in hiring black women. “Famously,” she said, “the court ruled that the company hired white women, thus was not guilty of sex discrimination and that the company hired black men and so was not guilty of race discrimination.” Because the court was focused on sex discrimination (gender), on the one hand, and race discrimination (racial identity) on the other, it was blind to the unique discrimination against black women (a third category besides race and gender). Likewise, Zambrana told us how the cultural nationalism that defined the process of Puerto Rican self-identification in the middle of the twentieth century aimed to homogenize what it meant to be culturally Puerto Rican and was thus exclusionary. For example, because cultural nationalists romanticized their Spanish heritage, they obscured the history of resistance against Spanish hegemony and marginalized those who continued to identify with the resistance.

Interview with José Medina

Natalie Cisneros

GETTYSBURG COLLEGE

José Medina is professor of philosophy and director of graduate studies at Vanderbilt University. He is the author of The Unity of Wittgenstein’s Philosophy: Necessity, Intelligibility, and Normativity (SUNY, 2002), Language, Key Concepts in Philosophy Series (Continuum, 2005), and Speaking From Elsewhere: A New Contextualist Perspective on Meaning, Identity, and Discursive Agency (SUNY, 2006). His most recent book, The Epistemology of Resistance: Gender and Racial Oppression, Epistemic Injustice, and Resistant Imaginations (Oxford, 2012), winner of the 2013 North American Society for Social Philosophy Book Award, discusses the epistemic aspects of race and gender oppression and explores avenues of resisting this injustice. This project, like much of his other work, underscores his influential voice in contemporary conversations surrounding race and gender theory, philosophy of language, and social epistemology. Along with these contributions, he is a leading thinker in the incorporation of Latina/o and Latin American philosophical perspectives into contemporary philosophical debates, especially in the areas of epistemology and philosophy of language.

I came to know José as a graduate student at Vanderbilt, where he directed my dissertation. His mentorship inspired and made possible my graduate work on questions of race, gender, oppression, and resistance, and he and his work continue to serve as major influences on my own projects. In this interview, José discusses how his intellectual and political interests emerged, and how they have evolved throughout his career. He also speaks to the current state of the field, including the contributions of Latina/o and Latin American thought, the relevance (or irrelevance) of disciplinary and subdisciplinary divisions, and the work that remains to be done in order to resist epistemic injustice in philosophical communities.

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Natalie Cisneros: Can you tell us a little bit about your early experiences growing up and how they may have influenced your work? How did you come to study philosophy?

José Medina: I grew up in Spain in the 1970s and 1980s, during the last years of the Franco dictatorship and the early years of the democratic transformation. It was a time of political turmoil, a time where you could still feel the political
repression and the social silences in all areas of life, public and private, but it was also a time of vibrant resistance, full of political possibilities, with the formation of strong communities that were articulating political demands and denouncing their oppression publically for the first time in Spain, and philosophers had an important role to play there. I am thinking in particular about the early Spanish feminists and queer activists. The demonstrations, the performances, the town-hall meetings, the critical discussions of that time taught me that sexuality could be a site of resistance and political contestation, and more generally that issues of identity were at the same time deeply personal and deeply political. One of the attractions for me to move to the United States in the early 1990s was to come to a place with a longer history of political struggles such as the fight for women's rights and for GLBT rights, although interestingly I found that American society was not changing and advancing on these issues as quickly and aggressively as Spain. But I moved to the US mainly for academic reasons. I came to Chicago to attend graduate school at Northwestern University and to work on issues of meaning and normativity, which for me were from the beginning also issues of identity and of political struggle. I had the fortune of receiving my graduate training in a place where I could do serious, specialized work in Wittgenstein and in critical theory at the same time.

NC: It’s fascinating that your decision to go to graduate school at Northwestern was motivated by your personal and philosophical interests in identity and political struggles, especially since this move, as you suggest, complicated and broadened your experience and understanding of these issues. How does Spain and your identity as an immigrant, and in general, influence your work?

JM: Like my sexual identity, my ethnic and national identity has been something that left me out of the mainstream in the United States, and it is also something that has shaped my work and how I approach philosophy. Although not fitting in anywhere completely, being multi-national and multi-lingual allowed me to articulate and approach things from different perspectives, to speak from elsewhere, as I call it. I have been very fortunate to find welcoming immigrant communities in which I feel at home, both in philosophy and outside philosophy, and both in the United States and outside the United States. I am thinking about transnational and global feminist and queer communities, but also about Latina/o communities—and I think it is important not to think of Latina/os as forming a single group, but rather, as a collection of communities, as a family (as Jorge Gracia would put it) or as a network of communities brought together by linguistic and cultural differences and historical experiences.

NC: Given your positionality within this network of Latina/o and queer communities, and the historical and current climate for women, people of color, and sexual minorities in professional philosophy, can you talk about your experiences in the discipline? What has changed since you entered into the profession, how do you think it needs to continue to evolve, and is that different from where you see it headed?

JM: Women, people of color, and sexual minorities are definitely better represented and more visible now than they were twenty years ago. But their representation and visibility are often constrained in problematic ways: for example, they are often relegated to certain areas (such as applied philosophy or feminism or race theory). And of course people of color are still heavily underrepresented in philosophy. The work of philosophers of color is receiving now more recognition and that is wonderful; but this recognition is also constrained, only given in special or applied areas or reserved for a very select few whose work is read and engaged by the mainstream. Only the work of very few philosophers of color (such as Linda Alcoff, Charles Mills, or Anthony Appiah) is discussed in areas such as epistemology and philosophy of language. Something that needs to happen more systematically, and not just sporadically, is for philosophers of color and their contributions to be able to reach and have an impact in core areas of philosophy. It is important that now more and more people are discussing issues of gender and race in these areas, so that these issues are no longer taken up only by racial and sexual minorities and they are no longer perceived as issues of special interest to some, but as central issues of interest to all. Think, for example, of recent discussions of race in epistemology by people like Miranda Fricker, or recent discussions of hate speech and racial slurs in philosophy of language by people like Ernest Lepore, Rebecca Kukla, and Mark Lance. At the same time, although it is a great step forward that these issues are addressed by all kinds of philosophers, there is also the danger of getting validation only when mainstream voices speak for us or speak to us. It is important to give credit and recognition to the long history of achievements by feminist philosophers and race theorists because sometimes their insights and provocative suggestions are appropriated by others without more acknowledgement or engagement than a passing remark or a footnote. To counter the marginalization of nonmainstream philosophical voices, it is important to have initiatives that bring minority groups together, celebrate their achievements, and nurture the next generation of scholars. In this sense, initiatives such as Mariana Ortega’s Latina Feminism Roundtable at John Carroll University and the Collegium of Black Women Philosophers created and led by Kathryn Gines at Penn State are invaluable. It is also important to have initiatives that put these minority philosophical communities in conversation with other groups (including mainstream ones). One example of this is The Latina Dialogues, a Latina feminism conference that Andrea Pitts and I are hosting at Vanderbilt University, where prominent Latina feminists will discuss their ongoing research with scholars in other areas, drawing connections, contrasts, and mutual challenges.

NC: Your commitment to resisting the marginalization of diverse voices is evidenced by your important service to the profession, including The Latina Dialogues conference as well as your service on the executive committee of the APA’s Eastern Division and the APA’s ad hoc committee on sexual harassment, as well as your research, which often takes up these concrete political problems of representation and subjugated knowledges and explores avenues of resisting the marginalization of the voices of women, people of color, and sexual minorities. This is a concern of your most recent book, The Epistemology of Resistance: Gender and Racial Oppression, Epistemic Injustice, and Resistant Imaginations (Oxford, 2012). Can you talk a bit about this project? How did it form? What are its central questions and motivations?
**JM:** The focus of the book is the epistemic side of oppression (social silences, bodies of ignorance and patterns of distortion, inabilities to listen and understand certain people and certain things, epistemic vices of all sorts, etc.); but more specifically, the book tries to uncover the different forms of resistance available to us to fight against the kinds of epistemic exclusion and marginalization associated with racism, sexism, and homophobia. I discuss how to resist epistemic injustices in ordinary interactions in our daily lives, but I also address how ordinary forms of contestation relate to social movements of resistance and political struggles that call for structural and institutional transformations. The book wrestles with the ways in which political, ethical, and epistemological questions are intertwined and have bearing upon one another. More specifically, it tries to contribute to what might be called political epistemology, which feminist epistemologists (such as standpoint theorists) and race theorists (such as Charles Mills) have been engaged in for a long time. I bring to these debates the polyphonic contextualism and kaleidoscopic perspectivalism that I have articulated in my previous work in philosophy of language (especially in Speaking from Elsewhere). Like my previous work, this book in social epistemology is “methodologically promiscuous” and combines various methods and philosophical styles that are not simply merged, but brought into critical dialogue with one another. My discussions engage with the recent literature in virtue epistemology and epistemic injustice, but they draw from bodies of literature that have been underrepresented in epistemology: pragmatism, critical race theory, queer theory, Latina feminism (from Sor Juana to Linda Alcoff), and transnational and women color feminisms (from Patricia Hill Collins to Uma Narayan). These bodies of literature are rarely brought together and put in conversation; they often only intersect or touch each other at the edges (when they do not simply ignore one another and their connections). It is difficult to bring all these different discussions together because there are terminological, methodological, and substantive differences. I don’t know if I have done justice (epistemic justice!) to all the voices and perspectives I have drawn from, but the risk was worth taking in order to bring all of them to bear on issues of silencing and epistemic marginalization, there was the need for a book-length treatment of the epistemic side of oppression that connected all these different vibrant discussions.

**NC:** You also work on major figures associated with the “analytic,” “continental” and “pragmatist” traditions (including in your most recent book, for example, where you productively draw on Wittgenstein, Foucault, and Addams, among others). In some ways, drawing together these philosophical traditions is just as difficult and potentially politically fraught as your work bringing together epistemological concerns and critical race and gender theories. But it is also equally vital. How do you understand the distinctions often made between these traditions? Why are you interested in drawing from each of them?

**JM:** I am a problem-oriented philosopher and draw from whatever resources might be useful to deal with a question. Very often philosophers in different traditions are dealing with similar and related questions, so why not explore those connections? Why not use their analyses and arguments in tandem (enriching each other, correcting each other, or simply challenging each other)? But given my contextualist sensibilities, of course I do not think that ideas and arguments should be simply taken out of context, disregarding the dynamics that shaped their trajectory. Sensitivity to context is key for a proper understanding and for responsible use of philosophical resources, but contexts can—and often should—be connected and put in critical dialogue with each other. It is also part of our intellectual responsibility as philosophers to call into question traditional and disciplinary boundaries, to challenge received interpretations and disciplinary habits, and to interrogate the lack of dialogue between traditions or between philosophical perspectives.

**NC:** This critical interrogation of traditional boundaries in your work is also evident in your work on philosophical traditions often excluded from the canon of academic philosophy in the United States and the West more broadly. Many of your works, including your most recent book, engages Latina/o and Latin American thought in particular, including contemporary Latina feminists such as Linda Alcoff and María Lugones, and figures from the history of Latin American philosophy, including José Martí and Sor Juana Inés de la Cruz. How did you become interested in working on Latina/o and Latin American thought? What do you think Latina/o and Latin American philosophy contribute to the contemporary landscape of philosophy in the United States?

**JM:** I received very limited exposure to Latin American philosophy in Spain, but I was very interested from the
beginning in Latina feminist and queer thinkers, including the very early ones such as Sor Juana. I continued reading classic and contemporary Latin American philosophers when I was in graduate school in Chicago, but it was mainly self-taught because I didn’t have anybody to guide me or to explore those interests with me in philosophy. Interdisciplinary reading groups in Latin American philosophy helped me to identify authors and ideas that were useful for the issues I was working on and enabled me to approach the debates I was engaged with in different terms. There is still an unexplored wealth of ideas in Latin American philosophy that can illuminate and enrich many philosophical debates in the United States. People like Jorge Gracia and Ofelia Schutte have been pioneers in calling attention to the history of Latin American philosophy and using its resources. There is a new generation of Latina/o scholars (such as Andrea Pitts) doing superb historical work and bringing classic figures in this tradition to bear on contemporary debates. There is also the ground-breaking work of philosophers such as Linda Alcoff and Eduardo Mendieta who have combined Latin American philosophy and critical theory, and there is much more to be done in following their footsteps. But if there is a single school of thought that I want to highlight for its originality and its contributions to the contemporary philosophical landscape, it is Latina feminism because, with their heterogeneous and often conflicting voices, Latina feminists have raised challenging questions and offered provocative suggestions about identity, relationality, intersectionality, solidarity, social justice, and community formation—questions and suggestions that have created an agenda for ongoing and future debates. And I think the next generation of Latina feminists will continue and deepen this trajectory of highly original and provocative research. The cutting-edge work of young Latina feminists on intersectionality is already breaking new ground and opening new avenues of interdisciplinary research, bringing together race, nationality, class, sexuality, and other aspects of identity in very productive and provocative ways. A prime example of this is your forthcoming book on immigration, The "Illegal Alien": An Intersectional and Genealogical Approach (Columbia University Press).

NC: Given the contributions of Latina/o philosophy, and Latina feminism in particular, to thinking through contemporary philosophical and political problems, can you say more about the possibilities and opportunities for dialogue between Latin American philosophical thought and European or American philosophical thought? What do you find fruitful about reading thinkers from these traditions together?

JM: The problem is that the dialogue has always been going in one direction: Latin American philosophers have always been responding to European and Anglo-American philosophers, reacting to their ideas, integrating them, applying them, offering alternatives, etc. But the dialogue has rarely taken place in the other direction: for the most part, European and Anglo-American philosophers have simply ignored philosophical discussions in Latin America. Things have been changing a bit recently with a few Latin American philosophers acquiring prominence and being taken seriously. But there is still a long way to go until there is a truly reciprocal dialogue, and the work to be done cannot be done exclusively by Latina/o philosophers in the United States working across traditions. Others have to do their part as well. With recent demographic and geopolitical changes, there seem to be new curricular demands for Latin American philosophy, and this can help change things by giving more visibility and recognition to this tradition and making it available to new generations. I think one of the valuable consequences of reading Anglo-American and Latin-American philosophers together (John Dewey and José Martí, for example) is that it helps you situate their perspectives and it gives you a good sense of the diversity of American philosophical voices and the truly pluralistic nature of philosophy in the Americas. It also brings issues of coloniality, post-coloniality, and imperialism to the fore in a way that contrasts sharply with the invisibility of these issues when Anglo-American and European philosophers talk among themselves. This is another important critical payoff.

NC: What is the direction of your work now? What are the questions you continue to be interested in working on?

JM: I find myself these days occupied with responding to the critics of my last book. I am honored that the book is getting so much attention and that there are already some objections and critical challenges raised about my view of epistemic responsibility and my notions of "meta-insensitivity" and "meta-blindness." Taking time to respond to my critics is an opportunity to clarify and elaborate further the ideas of The Epistemology of Resistance, and this helps me with the development of my new projects because they draw from my analysis of epistemic injustice and epistemic resistance. The focus of my current projects is the imagination. In particular, I am interested in how we can take responsibility, individually and collectively, for our imagination and its limits. These projects connect the literature on the imagination in philosophy of mind, epistemology, and social theory. The book project I am planning to develop first has the working title "Imagination and the Ethics of Acknowledgement" and it draws from Wittgenstein and the epistemology of ignorance. As I conceive it now, the book will develop a Wittgensteinian view of the imagination that calls attention to the opacity and self-ignorance constitutive of our subjectivity and agency. Through this Wittgensteinian exploration of the personal and interpersonal aspects of our imaginative capacities and their limits, I want to flesh out my notion of shared epistemic responsibility. This demands from us that we subject ourselves to critical scrutiny in interactive practices of contestation so that we can recognize our blindspots and how they obscure some aspects of our own experiences and of our interactions with others, making problematic the intelligibility of certain domains of human experience and social life. I want to develop these ideas more specifically with respect to the racial imagination. But I think that this will become a separate book or a collection of essays in which I offer an account of the different communicative and epistemic injustices associated with racialized ways of imagining. I am interested in developing an analysis and critique of different kinds of racial insensitivity and their defense mechanisms, exploring ways in which we can resist them through improved communicative dynamics and transformed practices of interaction. I think about this project under the rubric "Resisting the Racial Imagination."
talk a bit about what you see as the role of philosophy in contemporary society? What does philosophical work have to do with our political, ethical, and everyday lives?

**JM:** That is a really important and a really difficult question. One of the results of the professionalization and narrow specialization of philosophers is that our work often becomes too far removed from ordinary affairs, too detached from the lives and concerns of ordinary people. But we have an obligation to connect our philosophical reflections (no matter how abstract they get) back to real life and real people; not that each of us needs to do this in every essay or in every class, but we collectively have the responsibility to show how our critical reflections bear on people’s lives and problems. For me, philosophy should be a critical activity that offers new avenues for thinking and acting to people. It is in this sense that I am drawn to philosophers like Wittgenstein and Jane Addams, whose philosophical reflections begin and end with actual practices and people’s lived experiences, that should the starting point and the end point of our philosophical exercise and in between what we need to produce and work with is perplexity, that is, a deep interrogation of how we do things and how we think and feel, an interrogation that interrupts the flow of familiarity and obviousness of our lives, making the familiar unfamiliar and the obvious bizarre. The emphasis placed on the critical potential of perplexity by philosophers like Addams and Wittgenstein (and of course many others since Socrates) points in the direction of processes of self-estrangement and self-questioning in which we look at ourselves with fresh eyes, and we become capable of calling into question things we have taken for granted and have become invisible to us, being then able to recognize limitations and possibilities for transformation and improvement. Of course, making people perplexed is not enough. Philosopher (in collaboration with other scholars and also with artists and activists) need to find ways of making that perplexity productive in leading people to think and act better, not just in more sophisticated ways, but also and more importantly in ethically, politically, and epistemically responsible ways. Ways of doing this can be found in the critical methodologies of feminist theory, queer theory, and critical race theory. These are some of the most innovative theories philosophy has offered in recent years and they have a tremendous transformative potential for our political, ethical, and everyday lives.

**NC:** As we’ve discussed, in your written work you actively and critically interrogate philosophical, political, and epistemological assumptions. In doing so, you engage in this important work of making your readers more perplexed while asking them to think and act in more responsible ways. How do you work in teaching and mentoring play into this practice of philosophy for you?

**JM:** I cannot think of philosophy without teaching as an essential part, whether in the classroom, reading groups, workshops, conferences, or in more informal ways. Philosophy is a self-critical exercise, but for me it is not something that can be done by individuals in isolation because it requires a practice of mutual interrogation and challenge; it involves learning from others and their critical exercises as well as offering our own reflections for the learning of others. One thing that I think philosophy as a critical activity should help us do is to bring teaching and activism closer together, so that our philosophical activities become oriented toward the critique and transformation of both theories and practices at the same time. This aspiration is something that have in common with all the authors I draw from: pragmatists, feminists, queer theorists, and critical race theorists. The ways in which these different theorists practice philosophy provide useful paradigms or models for how to do philosophy in a critical and transformative way, working toward making a difference in people’s lives.

**BOOK REVIEW**

**A Cadre of Color in the Sea of Philosophical Homogeneity: On the Marginalization of African Americans and Latino/as in Academic Philosophy**


Reviewed by Grant J. Silva

**Marquette University**

For readers interested in acquiring insight into the plight of people of color in academic philosophy, particularly the predicament of African Americans and Latino/as in the field, *Reframing the Practice of Philosophy* is incredibly illuminating while simultaneously upsetting. Each essay tackles tough questions of inclusion and exclusion in ways that reveal an assortment of biases and structural flaws latent to professional philosophy. “The attempt to explore and explicate the lack of African Americans and Latinos/as in the field of philosophy,” Yancy writes, “actually resulted in a much broader and comprehensive text that uncovered complex multifaceted issues such as alienation, institutional prejudices, insidious racism, canonical exclusion, linguistic exclusion, nonrecognition, disrespect, white hegemony and power, discursive silencing, philosophical territorial arrogance, and indignation” (2). The volume is a powerful, self-conscious, and exigent analysis of one of the whitest fields in academia. More honest conversations like this must take place in order for our field to reinvent itself along more equitable lines, assuming that this is indeed a collective goal.

Almost every essay addresses one or more of the above issues through insightful argumentation infused with autobiographic prose—a hallmark of several of Yancy’s volumes. The contributors comprise a prominent list of active Latino/a and Black voices in professional philosophy, many of whom specialized in more “mainstream” areas of philosophy prior to delving into such topics as philosophy of race, feminist theory, Latin American philosophy, Caribbean philosophy, Africana philosophy, and more. Through their efforts, the volume asks meta-philosophical questions about the nature and practice of philosophical inquiry in societies shaped by legacies of racism and other forms of widespread, systematic oppression. How has the history of classical, institutional, and non-conscious forms of racism, particularly...
Latin American philosophy, Francisco’s interests include existentialism and twentieth-century European philosophy, especially the work of Martin Heidegger. He is particularly interested in examining the affective bases of rational agency and the role that moods and emotional events can play in changing the way individuals and groups experience the world.

Robert Sánchez is a visiting assistant professor of philosophy at the College of William & Mary, where he has taught for four years. He is also an affiliated faculty member in the Latin American studies program. He earned his Ph.D. in philosophy at the University of California, Riverside, in January 2012 and works primarily on Latin American philosophy, the philosophy of Wittgenstein and Kierkegaard, and ethical issues related to race, identity, diversity, and immigration.

Grant J. Silva is assistant professor of philosophy at Marquette University. Specializing in Latin American philosophy, the philosophy of race, and political philosophy, Grant is currently working on a manuscript entitled The Political Nature of Latin American Philosophy: Nation-Building, Nation-Fixing, Nation-Transcending. In addition, he is in the process of publishing several articles on the problem of democratic exclusion, the dynamic nature of racism, and the challenges that undocumented immigration and the militarization of the border pose to mainstream political philosophy.

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Kim Díaz works in socio-political philosophy within the American pragmatist, Latin American, and Eastern traditions. Her recent articles have been published in Philosophy in the Contemporary World, Societies Without Borders, and Pragmatism in the Americas. Kim received her Ph.D. from Texas A&M University in 2012 and is currently visiting assistant professor of philosophy at Sam Houston State University. She also serves as assistant editor to The Inter-American Journal of Philosophy.

Francisco Gallegos received his B.A. in philosophy from the University of New Mexico. He is currently in the philosophy Ph.D. program at Georgetown University. In addition to Latin American philosophy, Francisco’s interests include existentialism and twentieth-century European philosophy, especially the work of Martin Heidegger. He is particularly interested in examining the affective bases of rational agency and the role that moods and emotional events can play in changing the way individuals and groups experience the world.


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