Inquiry Network Workshop
Furman Hall
Room 003
Vanderbilt University
July 26-27, 2024
General information
About the workshop:
Recent years have seen a resurgence in the study of inquiry, the processes through which beliefs and other doxastic attitudes are formed and modified. Some contributions have addressed the nature of inquiry, including its relationship to a sui generis class of interrogiative attitudes such as curiosity and wondering. Others have addressed the norms governing inquiry, including duties to gather evidence and the proper resolution of inquiry. This workshop convenes leading scholars to discuss recent work in the philosophical study of inquiry.
The Inquiry Network
The Inquiry Network is a scholarly network devoted to the philosophical study of Inquiry. The Inquiry Network was founded in 2020 and organizes a series of events, including an ongoing work-in-progress series.
The Inquiry Network is directed by Arianna Falbo (Bentley), Dennis Whitcomb (Western Washington), and David Thorstad (Vanderbilt). It is overseen by a steering committee consisting of:
Avery Archer, George Washington University
Nathan Ballantyne, Arizona State University
Georgi Gardiner, Tulane University
Christoph Kelp, University of Glasgow
Jonathan Matheson, University of North Florida
Anne Meylan, University of Zurich
Jared Millson, Rhodes College
Susanna Siegel, Harvard University
Lani Watson, University of Oxford
Elise Woodard, King’s College, London
More information about the Inquiry Network is available at https://inquirynetwork.weebly.com/.
Registration
To register to attend the workshop, please contact David Thorstad (david.thorstad@vanderbilt.edu).
Sponsorship
This workshop is supported by the Vanderbilt Philosophy Department and Vanderbilt College of Arts and Sciences.
Friday, June 26
9:00AM-9:30AM Breakfast
9:30AM-11AM Speaker: Dennis Whitcomb (Western Washingon)
Paper: Lysistrata’s lament: Interrogative analogues of testimonial injustice
11AM-11:30AM Coffee
11:30AM-1PM Speaker: Z Quanbeck (Princeton)
Paper: Structural zetetic norms
1PM-2:30PM Lunch
2:30PM-4PM Speaker: Arianna Falbo (Bentley)
Paper: TBD
4:00PM-4:30PM Coffee
4:30PM-6PM Speaker: Juan Murillo Vargas (MIT)
Paper: Why is cognition question-sensitive?
Saturday, June 27
9:00AM-9:30AM Breakfast
9:30AM-11AM Speaker: Caroline von Klemperer (Rutgers)
Paper: Due respect makes demands of our zetetic practices: a more complete picture of the ethics of our cognitive lives
11AM-11:30AM Coffee
11:30AM-1PM Speaker: Peter van Elswyk (Northwestern)
Paper: The nature of questions
1PM-2:30PM Lunch
2:30PM-4PM Speaker: Julia Staffel (UC-Boulder)
Paper: Are there transitional beliefs? – I think so?
Abstracts
Z Quanbeck, “Structural zetetic norms”
Recent years have seen a “zetetic turn” in epistemology attending to the nature and content of zetetic norms. Some philosophers argue that zetetic norms should be classified exclusively as epistemic norms, while others argue that zetetic norms should be classified exclusively as practical norms. In this talk, I show how attending to the distinction between being substantive rational—which consists in correctly responding to one’s reasons—and being structurally rational—which consists in having mental states that cohere or fit together—provides strong support for a distinctive, expansive account of “Zetetic Pluralism.” The account I defend develops aspects of extant views on which some zetetic norms are substantive epistemic norms and others are substantive practical norms, while also positing a largely overlooked class of distinctively structural zetetic norms. In addition to avoiding problems facing extant views, this account of Zetetic Pluralism provides a neat, satisfying resolution of apparent conflicts between zetetic norms and traditional epistemic norms.
Julia Staffel, “Are there transitional beliefs? – I think so?”
A question that has gathered much interest in epistemology recently is whether it can ever be rational to keep inquiring into a question once one has adopted a belief that answers it. Friedman (2019) has prominently argued for a negative answer to this question. I am interested in a related, but slightly different question here, which has not gathered any attention, but will help us better understand the nature of belief and its relation to inquiry and deliberation: Is it ever rationally permissible to believe something prior to concluding one’s deliberation? My question differs from the more commonly discussed one, insofar as it asks about the rationality of believing that p before settling on p as the answer to some question Q, while the commonly discussed one asks about the rationality of continuing to inquire into Q after coming to believe that p is the answer to Q. I will argue that it is possible for rational agents to hold beliefs of a certain kind, which I call transitional beliefs, prior to settling on an answer to a question. Further, I will show that many common claims about what beliefs are don’t identify important features of belief itself, but of attitudes that are held as conclusions of deliberations more generally.
Juan Murillo Vargas, “Why is cognition question-sensitive?”
Questions get around these days. We use them to model discourse structure, think about inquiry, and theorize about the nature of belief. Question: why are different parts of cognition question-sensitive? I suggest tractability is an important part of this answer. To that end I first argue that questions only seem to feature in central cognitive processes like communicating, inquiring, or belief-formation, rather than in plausibly modular ones, such as syntax or perception. Then I argue on both conceptual and empirical grounds that this makes sense if questions help keep central cognition tractable: they reduce the hypothesis space central cognitive processes have to consider without sacrificing flexibility. I conclude with some predictions my proposal makes about other parts of central cognition, and by connecting it with the “zetetic turn” in epistemology.
Dennis Whitcomb, “Lysistrata’s lament: Interrogative analogues of testimonial injustice”
When a person commits a testimonial injustice, the unjust thing they do consists in their reaction to an assertion (theorists diverge on the details; paradigmatically it involves prejudicially refraining from believing the assertion). Whatever reactions to questions are analogous to these reactions to assertions, those things are interrogative injustices. I explore some models of those things and apply them to some non-ideal cases. One of the models appeals to mental states like curiosity and wonder, telling us that interrogative injustice occurs when hearers prejudicially refrain from adopting those mental states. Other models appeal to common conversational goals – these goals including the answering of questions. On these models, interrogative injustice occurs when a person asks a question, and another person prejudicially blocks the answering of that question from joining the common goals. Or, if they don’t block said answering, perhaps they believe that it should be thus blocked. Or perhaps they merely resist the question, not fully blocking its answering from joining the common goals but instead pushing back against it in some other way. Or perhaps they merely believe that they should resist the question. I endorse a pluralism on which each of these things can be an interrogative injustice.
Peter van Elswyk, “The nature of questions”
TBD
Arianna Falbo, Paper TBD
TBD
Caroline von Klemperer, “Due respect makes demands of our zetetic practices: a more complete picture of the ethics of our cognitive lives”
TBD