Tracy Graves
Carl Schmitt, “Definition of Sovereignty”
10/27/04

Carl Schmitt’s political theory is based in large part on the idea of exception (Ausnahmezustand).  For Schmitt, the true test of the sovereignty of a ruler is the instance of exception.  The exception “can at best be characterized as a case of extreme peril, a danger to the existence of the state, or the like” (6).  The nature of exception cannot be defined by law.  Because the leader of a government rules not only over the day-to-day lives of his people, but also over the instance of exception, his relation to exception is located both within the law and on its borders.  The true test of a leader’s sovereignty occurs when everyday life is disrupted, when the legal system anticipates the exception and “suspend[s] itself” (14).  It is the leader’s job to decide when the exception occurs and what may be done to eliminate it.  In this construction of state, the decision is the act with which a political leader defines his sovereignty.  For Schmitt, the decision is two-fold.  It lies in both identifying when an exception has occurred and implementing a plan to restore or create normal order anew.  Only when the governing entity sees itself identified as having the power to suspend law and is capable of restoring order is it truly sovereign.

The impetus for Schmitt’s “Definition of Sovereignty” was a debate surrounding Article 48 of the Weimar constitution.  For Schmitt, it is the article in juxtaposition with the whole of the constitution that presupposes an attempt to subsume the exception.   More simply put, the location of the article within the constitution, in Schmitt’s eyes, took sovereign power out of the hands of the ruler by limiting the ways in which the ruler might approach the exception.  According to Schmitt, the popular interpretation of the article divides the sovereignty of the ruler by placing checks and balances on that sovereignty in the hands of the parliamentary body.  The critique of this liberal constitutionalism is the focal point of Schmitt’s argument about sovereignty.

One of the most problematic aspects of Schmitt’s argument centers on the discussion of the decision.  For Schmitt, the exception reveals the decision in “absolute purity” as the origin of the existing legal order (13).  More simply put, the sovereign ruler’s decision that a normal order exists is the only guarantee that it does exist.  It seems here that the sovereign ruler’s only responsibility is to the state.  Schmitt’s theory says little about the ruler’s responsibility to the general populace.  In Schmitt’s defense, Schwab reiterates the assumption that the state’s raison d’être is to assure citizens stability and order (xix).  However, Schmitt’s insistence on the importance of absolute sovereignty locates the sovereign ruler above any sort of reasoning of that nature.  By putting the fact of the decision above the content of the decision, Schmitt renders the content void.

Indicative of a critique of the government of Weimar Germany, M renders the police state of the film impotent by virtue of the outcome of the search for and capture of the child murderer Beckert.  While the organized criminal underground—an entity that functions systematically by suspending law—is successful in locating and capturing the murderer, it is not responsible for bringing him to justice and restoring order.  The police, on the other hand,  are not only unsuccessful at suspending the law and finding the criminal, but also have little success in maintaining order under Beckert’s threat.  At the end of the film two images linger: a judge with gavel in hand followed by a shot of a group of forlorn mothers gazing judgmentally into the camera.  Can we assume that justice is served and that normal order is restored?  What of the judge’s decision?  Is the shot of the women at the end of the film a commentary on the content of that decision?  Are we left with the sense that the state’s sovereignty cannot be restored?

Can we take Schmitt’s concept of sovereignty out of the realm of political discourse and apply it to the construction of the film?  Where, then, would we locate the exception?  Does the film medium itself constitute an exception?  Or is it the addition of sound to the art form that may constitute the exception?  Would looking at the film through Schmitt’s theory help us to better understand the power with which the film (a) ignores our notions of fixed entities such as time and space and (b) creates tensions between the visual and the acoustic?

Does Schraenker's body language, in the kangaroo court scene, render him sovereign?  If so, how?  What about his interactions with Beckert and others in the kangaroo court?  Is Schraenker's body language and general demeanor the same in this scene as in  previous ones?  How does Beckert respond to what is happening?  What role does the camera play in all this?  Can we compare the kangaroo court scene to any scenes in Judgment at Nuremburg?