Mechanism Design for Scheduling with Uncertain Execution Time*

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Abstract
We study the problem where a task (or multiple unrelated tasks) must be executed, there are multiple machines/agents that can potentially perform the task, and our objective is to minimize the expected sum of the agents’ processing times. Each agent does not know exactly how long it will take him to finish the task; he only knows the distribution from which this time is drawn. These times are independent across agents and the distributions fulfill the monotone hazard rate condition. Agents are selfish and will lie about their distributions if this increases their expected utility.

We study different variations of the Vickrey mechanism that take as input the agents’ reported distributions and the players’ realized running times and that output a schedule that minimizes the expected sum of processing times, as well as payments that make it an ex-post equilibrium for the agents to both truthfully report their distributions and exert full effort to complete the task. We devise the ChPE mechanism, which is uniquely tailored to our problem, and has many desirable properties including: not rewarding agents that fail to finish the task and having non-negative payments.

Introduction
Task (re)allocation is a crucial component of many multi-agent systems. When these systems consist of multiple self-interested agents, it is important to carefully consider the incentives that agents are given to take on tasks. The wrong incentives may, for example, lead an agent to report that it will complete the task much faster than it actually can. As a result, the task may not be allocated to the agent that can complete the task most efficiently in actuality, resulting in a loss of social welfare. Mechanism design provides the natural framework for considering such incentive questions. Mechanism design is a branch of game theory that constructs social choice functions that take as input agents preferences and choose an outcome which is an equilibrium for the agents. Another key issue is uncertainty: a cloud provider that is considering running a program provided by an unknown user in general cannot perfectly predict how long the execution will take. However, the cloud provider can reasonably have a probability distribution over the length of execution.

In this work, we construct mechanisms for scheduling a single1 job, in the setting where each of the $n$ selfish machines only knows the distribution from which its own running time is drawn. The mechanism then outputs a schedule that determines which machine gets to compute when (allowing preemption). It also outputs payments, which may also be based on which machine completed the job and when. We focus on efficient mechanisms, i.e., mechanisms that schedule the machines to minimize the total expected processing time, and require them to be truthful. We propose multiple such mechanisms, but our favorite is the ChPE mechanism, which has the most desirable properties. It is a type of Groves mechanism, but one in which an agent can affect the $h$ term of its own payment (while in the classical Groves mechanism (see Section 9.3.3 of (Nisan et al. 2007) for definition) the $h$ part can only depend on the values of the other players). This would seem problematic, except with a neat technical trick we are able to prove that the agent cannot affect the expectation of this $h$ term.

Related work. (Nisan and Ronen 2001) proposed, among other paradigmatic algorithmic mechanism design problems, a mechanism design version of the problem of scheduling unrelated machines. (Archer and Tardos 2001) followed up proposing a mechanism design version of scheduling related machines. In our work the payments are sometimes based in part on performance, rather than only on the machines’ reports. This relates to the literature on mechanism design with partial verification, where the center can detect some, but not all of the lies. This was first formalized by Green and Laffont (Green and Laffont 1986), and subsequently studied in a number of papers. (Nisan and Ronen 2001) as well as several follow-up papers (e.g., (Auletta et al. 2006; Krysta and Vento 2010; Fotakis and Zampetakis 2013; Caragiannis et al. 2012)) constructed mechanisms with verification for scheduling and auction settings. Our setting can be thought of as having “noisy” verification, where we have only probabilistic evi-

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dence that an agent was lying, because its performance is unlikely (but not impossible) given the distribution it reported.

The general phenomenon of execution uncertainty in mechanism design, a key concept in our work, has already been addressed in a number of other papers (Porter et al. 2008; Johnson 2013; Ramchurn et al. 2009; Stein et al. 2011; Feige and Tennenholtz 2011). For example, in (Porter et al. 2008), each machine has a probability of failure and has a cost for attempting the task. In fact, in all these papers, each machine has a fixed cost for attempting the task, whereas in our case, the cost depends on how many time steps we allow the machine to run (we assume the cost is 1 per unit of time). (Porter et al. 2008; Johnson 2013) also deal with the case where the machines are correlated. In contrast to our work (Porter et al. 2008; Johnson 2013; Ramchurn et al. 2009) only allow the task to be allocated to a single machine. The closest paper to our work is (Stein et al. 2011), which does allow the task to be allocated to multiple machines. However, in their work, once a machine is invoked it cannot be stopped or preempted, and the only reason to invoke multiple machines is to meet a deadline. In contrast, we allow the schedule to re-assign the task to different machines at different time steps, simply to minimize expected total processing time. Although Vickrey-type mechanisms with verification are also proposed in these papers, they do not obtain all the desirable properties of the ChPE mechanism that we propose for our setting.

From an economic perspective, in our setting, an interesting type of interdependence in the agents’ utility functions emerges. That is, a machine’s expected utility depends not only on its true type (=distribution) and all agents’ reported types, but additionally on the true types of the other agents. This is why we only obtain ex-post equilibrium rather than dominant strategies. This is so because an agent cares about the probability that the job is finished early, both for the sake of the processing cost it would otherwise incur later and for its payment, and this probability is affected by the others’ true types. As is common for mechanism design with interdependence, we need to relax our solution concept from dominant strategies to ex-post equilibrium. Interdependence arises in a very similar manner as in our setting in (Stein et al. 2011), while in (Ramchurn et al. 2009) interdependence exists due to a different reason, namely agents reporting on each other’s likelihood to succeed.

**Model and definitions** There is a single job that needs to be processed and a set $N = \{1, \ldots, n\}$ of machines/players. The objective is to minimize the expected processing time. A machine does not know the exact time that it would need to finish the task, but it does know a distribution over this time; this distribution will be its private information in the mechanism design problem. Note that this is not the distribution over its type; the distribution is its type. (In principle a prior (meta-) distribution over these types could be specified, but we will not need to do so in this paper as we will not investigate solution concepts such as Bayes-Nash equilibrium.)

If machine $i$ spends a unit of time on the task, it will either finish, or learn that it has not finished, but obtain no further information about how much more time it would need to finish. Formally, let the discrete random variable $T_i$ denote the running time of machine $i$, which is the time it would need if it continued to run on the job until its completion. We will use $t_i \in \{1, 2, \ldots\} \cup \{\infty\}$ to denote a realization of $T_i$. Let $f_i$ denote the probability density function of $T_i$, i.e., $P(T_i = t_i) = f_i(t_i)$. Furthermore let $F_i$ denote the cumulative density function of $T_i$, i.e., $P(T_i < t_i) = F_i(t_i)$. Let $\zeta_i(t_i) = f_i(t_i)/(1 - F_i(t_i))$ denote player $i$’s hazard rate, i.e., the probability, conditional on not having finished strictly before time $t_i$, of finishing at time $t_i$. (The distributions of two different players $i$ and $j$ are independent from each other.) The hazard rate function is very often used in risk management and reliability theory because it has been found useful and in clarifying the relationship between physical modes of failure.

We say player $i$’s distribution has a monotone hazard rate (MHR) if $\zeta_i(t_i)$ is non-increasing as a function of $t_i$. That is, the longer the machine has already run on the job, the less likely it is that it will finish immediately. We assume MHR throughout the paper. This reflects that, if player $i$ has multiple approaches that it can take towards solving the problem—for example, it can attempt one heuristic in each time unit—it is optimal for the player to try those that are most likely to succeed first. With respect to both human mortality rates and electromechanical failures, the shape of the hazard function over the lifetime has been found to often be monotone. The MHR condition is widely used and has a deep economical meaning. MHR is also a commonly used assumption in bayesian auctions. The condition we use here is slightly different since we want the function to be non-increasing instead of decreasing. A non-increasing hazard rate condition on the distribution of the probability of completion is used in a context very similar to ours in (Johnson 2013). Decreasing hazard rate distributions include the hyperexponential, Pareto, and some cases of Weibull.

The objective is to minimize the expected processing cost. We assume that the cost of processing per unit of time is 1 for all machines. The machines are selfish so they will not do any processing if they are not given an incentive (payment) to do so. A selfish player wants to maximize his expected utility, which is payment minus processing cost. Under this model, even though we allow the task to run on any number of machines at each time step, it is always suboptimal to schedule two machines to run in parallel during any time unit: one would be better off sequentializing the two units of processing time, just in case the job gets completed during the first time unit, so the second is no longer necessary. Hence, only one machine will run in each time unit.

We do allow preemption: e.g., the scheduler can let machine 1 run for two time units first, then let machine 2 run for three time units, then machine 1 for one time unit, etc. We emphasize that, with this schedule, the probability that we finish in the sixth time unit given that we have not finished earlier is $\zeta_1(3)$, not $\zeta_1(6)$, because this is only the third time unit in which machine 1 is actively processing. We will generally use $t_i$ to denote time on $i$’s “clock”, that is, $i$’s local time is $t_1 = 3$ when the global time is $t = 6$ in the above example. Once any machine finishes, all computation stops.
In a (direct-revelation) mechanism, each player \( i \) reports \( f_i \) (or, equivalently, \( \hat{\zeta}_i \)) to the mechanism. The mechanism, based on \((f_1, \ldots, f_N)\), produces as output a schedule \( s : \{1, 2, \ldots, T_s\} \rightarrow N \), where \( s(t) \) is the machine that is assigned to process at (global) time \( t \). \( s \) denotes the infinite vector \( s := (s(1), s(2), \ldots) \). Note that \( s \) does not contain the information of when the computation finishes. \( \Omega \) is the random variable that denotes the (global) time at which the computation finishes (and \( \omega \) for a realization of it).

Nothing we have said so far precludes the possibility that there is a positive probability of never finishing, resulting in infinite expected cost. For the sake of simplicity, in most of the paper, we simply assume this away by assuming that all hazard rates are bounded below by a positive constant. Towards the end of the paper, we abandon this assumption and consider the possibility that it may be better to give up on the task at some point, modeling that completion of the task has a value of \( \Phi \).

Our Results

The optimal schedule with MHR players

The MHR assumption makes it easy to find the optimal schedule given the machines’ true hazard rates: always greedily use the machine that currently has the highest hazard rate. In this subsection, which has no game-theoretic considerations, we prove this and discuss. Let \( t_i(s, t) \) be the number of occurrences of \( i \) in \( s \) before and at \( t \). That is, it denotes \( i \)'s local time at global time \( t \) under schedule \( s \). Then, let \( \zeta^*_i(t) = \zeta(s(t), t(s)) \) denote the hazard rate at time \( t \) under schedule \( s \).

**Lemma 1.** The probability that none of the machines has completed the task before time \( t \) is given by the formula:

\[
1 - F^s(t) = \prod_{t=1}^{t-1} (1 - \zeta^i(t')).
\]

**Proof.** Let \( T^s \) be a random variable that corresponds to the time at which we finish the task under schedule \( s \). From \( P(T^s < t') = P(T^s < t') + P(T^s = t') \) we get

\[
1 - F^s(t') = 1 - F^s(t') - (1 - F^s(t')) \frac{f^s(t')}{1 - F^s(t')},
\]

\[
= 1 - F^s(t') - (1 - F^s(t')) \zeta^s(t') = (1 - F^s(t'))(1 - \zeta^s(t')).
\]

From this recurrence we easily obtain the desired equality

\[
1 - F^s(t) = \prod_{t=1}^{t-1} (1 - \zeta^s(t')).
\]

A greedy schedule \( g \) at each time step \( t \) assigns the machine that maximizes \( \zeta(s(t), t(s)) \) by being so assigned. Under the MHR assumption, this corresponds to obtaining the schedule simply by sorting all the machines’ individual hazard rates. We now prove it is optimal assuming MHR.

**Proposition 1.** Under the MHR assumption, for every \( t \), \( g \in \arg \max_s F^s(t) \) (and, a fortiori, \( g \in \arg \min_s E[T^s] \)).

**Proof.** For the sake of contradiction, consider a schedule \( s \) where for some \( t \), \( \zeta^N.(t) < \zeta^N.(t+1) \). From MHR, it follows that \( s(t) \neq s(t+1) \). Hence, the modified schedule defined by \( s'(t) = s(t+1), s'(t+1) = s(t), s' = s \) everywhere else flips these two hazard rates. From Lemma 1, it follows that \( F^N.s'(t+1) > F^N.s(t+1) \), and \( F^N.s'(t') = F^N.s(t') \) for all \( t' \neq t + 1 \). Hence, sorting all the hazard rates that are used in a schedule will improve it.

This may still not result in a greedy schedule, because some hazard rates may not occur in the schedule at all. So, again for the sake of contradiction, consider a schedule \( s \), that has all of the hazard rates that it uses in sorted order, with the following property: for some machine \( i \) and some \( t_i, i \) gets to compute at most \( t_i - 1 \) time units (after which it is never assigned again), even though \( \zeta(t_i) > \zeta^N.(t) \) for some \( t \). Then, consider inserting \( i \) at this point in the schedule to obtain \( s'(t) = i, s'(t') = s(t') \) for \( t < t_i \) and \( s'(t') = s(t' - 1) \) for \( t' > t \). Because \( s \) was in sorted order and MHR holds for \( i \), we have that \( \zeta^N.(s'(t)) = \zeta(t_i) \), and this is larger than all its subsequent hazard rates. From Lemma 1, it follows that \( F^N.s'(t') = F^N.s(t') \) for all \( t' < t \) and \( F^N.s'(t') > F^N.s(t') \) for all \( t' > t \). Hence, inserting unused hazard rates into the schedule at the appropriate points will improve it.

**Remark 1.** Note that the greedy algorithm is not optimal without the MHR assumption. Consider an example with two machines whose hazard rates are given according to the table below. The greedy schedule assigns the job to machine 2 forever, resulting in an expected completion time of 5. On the other hand, assigning the job to machine 1 forever results in an expected completion time of only 2.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>machine ( i \in {1, 2} )</th>
<th>( \zeta_1(1) )</th>
<th>( \zeta_1(2) )</th>
<th>( \zeta_i(t) ) if ( t \geq 3 )</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>machine ( i = 1 )</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>0.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>machine ( i = 2 )</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The following property about the optimal schedule will help us with the analysis of the ChpE mechanism and relies on MHR.

**Remark 2 (Consistency Property).** If \( s \) is optimal for agents \( N \), then we can obtain an optimal schedule for agents \( N \setminus \{i\} \) simply by (1) removing \( i \) from the schedule, and (2) if this results in a finite schedule (because the infinite tail end of the schedule was assigned to \( i \)), sorting the previously unused hazard rates of \( N \setminus \{i\} \) and appending them to the end of the finite schedule, as in the following example.

**Example 1.** For the following instance:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>machine ( i )</th>
<th>( \zeta(1) )</th>
<th>( \zeta(2) )</th>
<th>( \zeta_i(t) ) if ( t \geq 3 )</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>machine ( i = 1 )</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>0.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>machine ( i = 2 )</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>machine ( i = 3 )</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The ordered hazard rates are \( (0.9, 0.8, 0.7, 0.6, 0.6, \ldots) \) and the corresponding optimal schedule is \( (1, 2, 1, 1, 1, \ldots) \). If we then take out player 1, the ordered hazard rates become \( (0.8, 0.5, 0.4, 0.3, 0.3 \ldots) \) and the corresponding optimal schedule is \( (2, 2, 3, 2, 2, \ldots) \).

In examples like this, it can be helpful to, in a slight abuse of notation, insert all of the hazard rates into the schedule
from the outset: \((0.9, 0.8, 0.7, 0.6, 0.5, 0.4, 0.3, 0.2, 0.1)\) and \(s = (1, 2, 3, 2, 3)\), where \(\pi\) denotes an infinite number of occurrences of \(x\). The next machine after \(i\) will take over the computation only in the case that machine \(i\) is absent.

**Additional notation**

Now that we have a better understanding of optimal scheduling in our context, we introduce some further notation. Let random variable \(R_i\) denote the time that player \(i\) actually gets to run (and \(r_i\) to denote a value to which it realizes). We always have \(R_i \leq T_i\); it is strictly smaller if another player finishes before player \(i\) would have finished. Thus, it is a function of the time at which the task is completed as well as the schedule; we will use \(r_i(\omega, s)\) to denote this where it is not clear from context.

For any subset of the players \(S \subseteq N\), let \(T_S\) denote the time at which we would have finished if we had only had the players in \(S\) available (in which case we would sort their hazard rates and let them run in that order, as explained above). We also define \(R_S\) as the sum of the realized times of a group of players \(S\) until the task gets completed, if it can only be assigned to players in \(S\). Note that \(R_S = T_S\). Let \(\zeta_S(t)\) denote the corresponding sorted hazard rates, which define the distribution \(f_S\) over \(T_S\). We will refer to this distribution as the group distribution of \(S\).

**Solution Concept and Revelation Principle**

In this section, we review the solution concept we need and prove the corresponding revelation principle for our setting. We note that the players’ strategies allow them not only to lie about their types, but also to decide at each time step if they want to process or not, and whether they wish to announce having found a solution.

In an ex-post equilibrium, every agent plays a strategy that is optimal for any type it may have and for any types that the other agents may have, as long as the other agents tell the truth. This solution concept is stronger than Bayes-Nash equilibrium (an ex-post equilibrium is a Bayes-Nash equilibrium for any prior distribution over types) but weaker than dominant strategies (because it can be suboptimal to play according to the equilibrium if, for some reason, the other agents do not play according to the equilibrium). We will see later why we need this concept instead of dominant strategies.

**Definition 1.** In a scheduling game, machine \(i\)’s private information is her distribution \(f_i\) over her finish time. The mechanism first collects a reported distribution \(\hat{f}_i\) from every player. In each subsequent round, the scheduler (which constitutes part of the mechanism) asks (possibly stochastically) a subset of the machines to process on the job. (They are able to ignore this request.) When a machine announces it has found a solution (and this is verified), the game ends and the players receive payments according to the game’s (possibly stochastic) payment rule \(p\).

It should be noted that a direct-revelation scheduling mechanism is a special case of a scheduling game. (Scheduling games have no explicit scheduler, but all the scheduler does is send signals, so the machines can simulate the scheduler if needed.)

**Definition 3.** We say that a direct-revelation scheduling mechanism \(m\) is (ex-post) truthful if it is an ex-post equilibrium for the machines to truthfully report \(\hat{f}_i = f_i\), always process when asked, and always announce a solution immediately when it is found.

We are now able to prove a revelation principle. The approach is standard: simulate the equilibrium of the scheduling game by a direct-revelation mechanism.

**Theorem 1 (Revelation Principle).** Suppose that the scheduling game defined by payment rule \(r\) has an ex-post equilibrium given by behavioral strategies \(\sigma_1, \ldots, \sigma_n\). Then there exists an equivalent ex-post truthful direct-revelation scheduling mechanism \(m\).

We defer the technical definition of scheduling games and the proof of Theorem 1 to the full version.

**Proof.** We turn \((r, \sigma_1, \ldots, \sigma_n)\) into a direct-revelation mechanism \(m\) as follows. \(m\) first collects type \(\hat{f}_i\) from every machine. Based on this, it simulates the strategic play of the machines according to \(\sigma_1, \ldots, \sigma_n\). When, in this simulation, some (simulated) machine \(i^{\text{sim}}\) is supposed to process for one unit of time, \(m\) asks the corresponding (real) machine \(i\) to process for one unit time. If \(i\) announces having found a solution, then \(m\) (after verifying it) simulates that \(i^{\text{sim}}\) has found a solution; otherwise, it simulates that it has not found one. Note that in the simulation, \(i^{\text{sim}}\) may or may not immediately announce a solution it has found; if not, the simulation continues, though \(m\) will from this point on also simulate the processing rather than asking the real machines to process. When a machine in the simulation announces having found a solution, then \(m\) pays the corresponding real machines according to \(r\), and the game ends.

Now, suppose that in the resulting mechanism, for some particular profile, \(i\) has an incentive to deviate from truthful behavior when all others play truthfully. This deviation can consist of misreporting \(\hat{f}_i\), not (always) processing when asked, not immediately reporting a solution it has found, or some combination. The key insight is that the same deviation would be available in the original scheduling game (by acting according to the modified \(\hat{f}_i\), not computing in the corresponding rounds, and/or not immediately reporting a solution), with the same result. But by assumption, \(\sigma_1, \ldots, \sigma_n\) is an ex-post equilibrium of the scheduling game, so this
deviation cannot be beneficial, and we have arrived at a contradiction.

**Failure of Straightforward Adaptations of VCG**

It is natural to try to adapt VCG mechanisms (Vickrey 1961; Groves 1973; Clarke 1971). In this section we present what may be considered the most obvious way to adapt such mechanisms and show that the resulting mechanisms fail to be truthful. These mechanisms take the reported distributions \( f_i \) as input and produce the schedule \( s \) and the payments to the agents as output. The payments here do not in any way depend on the execution (realizations of the processing times), and herein lies their weakness, as we will see later.

**Expected Pure Groves (EPG):** The basic idea behind Groves mechanisms is to add to player \( i \)’s payment a term that corresponds to the (reported) welfare of the other players, thereby aligning the machine’s utility with the social welfare. (A term \( h_i \) that does not depend on player \( i \)’s report, can be added, to obtain mechanisms such as the Clarke mechanism; we will refer to the Groves mechanism where this \( h \) term is set to 0 as “Pure Groves.”) In the context we are considering here, this would mean that the payment that machine \( i \) receives is

\[-E_{T_i \sim f_i, \ldots, T_n \sim f_n}[R_N - R_i]\]

(Note that this is a negative amount.) That is, machine \( i \) pays the expected social cost, omitting the term that corresponds to its own cost. The idea is to align the machine’s utility with the social welfare.

It is natural to add an \( h \) term to obtain:

**Expected Clarke (EC):** In the Clarke mechanism, the \( h_i \) term is set to reflect the welfare that the other players would have had experienced without \( i \), so that \( i \)’s total payment is the difference \( i \) causes in the welfare of the other players. In the context considered here, this would play out as follows. Player \( i \) receives the EPG term \(-E_{T_i \sim f_i, \ldots, T_n \sim f_n}[T_N - T_i]\), plus the following \( h \) term:

\[h_i(f_{-i}) = E_{T_{-i} \sim f_{-i}}[T_N \setminus (i)]\]

That is, the \( h \) term is the expected processing time that would result without \( i \), taking the others’ reports at face value. Its total payment is now nonnegative: because we are scheduling to minimize expected processing time, the expected processing time of the other machines cannot go up when \( i \) is introduced. Note that \( i \) cannot do anything to affect its \( h_i \) term.

**Misreporting and miscomputing examples**

We now show that under EPG and EC, a machine may have an incentive to misreport its distribution. Moreover, they generally have an incentive to “miscompute”, that is, not actually process on the task when they are supposed to.

**Proposition 2.** Under both EPG and EC, a machine can sometimes benefit from misreporting its distribution (even when the others report and compute truthfully).

**Proof.** We consider the case where the true types of the players are given by the following table:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>machine ( i )</th>
<th>( \zeta_i(1) )</th>
<th>( \zeta_i(t) (t \geq 2) )</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>machine ( i = 1 )</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>machine ( i = 2 )</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>machine ( i = 3 )</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The optimal schedule is \((1, 2, 3, 3, \ldots)\).

In this example, the expected utility of player 1, under EPG, when everybody behaves truthfully, is equal to \(-1 - [(1-0.4)\cdot0.3\cdot1+(1-0.4)(1-0.3)\cdot0.2\cdot2+\ldots].\) (The first term is the actual processing cost that machine 1 incurs in the first round, and the second term is player 1’s payment, i.e., what the mechanism believes is the expected processing cost of all the other players.) Now suppose that machine 1 decides to overreport its probability of finishing in the first time slot, which does not change the allocation. The intuition is that by lying and overreporting, player 1 makes the expected sum of processing times of the other players seem smaller.

The expected utility of machine 1 then becomes equal to \(-1 - [(1-0.5)\cdot0.3\cdot1+(1-0.5)(1-0.3)\cdot0.2\cdot2+\ldots],\) which is larger than the same expression where 0.5 is replaced by 0.4. This shows that player 1 has an incentive to misreport. The exact same example works to show the same for EC. (There will be an additional \( h \) term in 1’s utility, but this term will be the same with or without misreporting.)

In fact, these mechanisms suffer from an even more basic problem: because the payments do not depend on performance, there is no incentive to actually process when asked.

**Proposition 3.** Under both EPG and EC, a machine can benefit from failing to process when it is supposed to (even when the others report and compute truthfully).

**Proof.** Consider again the example from the previous proof. If player 1 never computes, the first \((-1)\) term in his utility will disappear, and his payment will be unaffected.

**Good mechanisms**

As we have seen, some adaptations of VCG mechanisms have poor incentive properties in our context. However, as we will now show, VCG mechanisms can be adapted in other ways that do have desirable incentive properties. We introduce three specific mechanisms. All these mechanisms, except for ChPE, can be defined without assuming MHR.

**Realized Pure Groves (RPG)** The payment that player \( i \) receives is \( -(R_N - R_i) \) (a negative amount). That is, once the job has been completed, machine \( i \) pays the realized social cost, omitting the term that corresponds to its own cost. The idea is to align the machine’s utility with the social welfare.

As we will see later, this mechanism is in fact truthful. Unfortunately, it has other undesirable properties: machines always have to make payments, in addition to performing
work, so their utility is always negative. In standard mechanism design contexts, this can be addressed by adding an $h$ term to the payment function which depends only on the others’ reports, to obtain the Clarke mechanism or one of its cousins. In our context, however, it is not immediately clear whether this $h$ term should depend only on the reports, or also on the realized processing times. Our next mechanism does the former.

Clarke, $h$ in Expectation (ChE): Player $i$ receives the RPG term $-(r_N − r_i)$, plus the following $h$ term:

$$h_i(f_{−i}) = E_{T_{−i} \sim f_{−i}}[T_{N \setminus \{i\}}]$$

That is, the $h$ term is the expected processing time that would result without $i$, taking the others’ reports at face value.

Since there is nothing that machine $i$ can do to affect its $h$ term, the incentives are the same as for RPG. This is a familiar argument in mechanism design. What is perhaps more surprising is that in our next mechanism, the $h$ term does depend on the realization, and player $i$ will be able to affect it.

Clarke, $h$ Partially in Expectation (ChPE): A natural thought at this point would be that we should use the realized value of $h$ instead of its expectation. However, some reflection reveals that this does not make sense: at the point where the task is finished, we generally will not be able to determine how much longer the other machines would have taken. By forcing them to continue to run on the task in order to determine this, we would jettison efficiency. However, we do know something about how long the other agents would have taken. If agent $i$ was the one to finish, and the other agents had incurred $r_{N \setminus \{i\}}$ at that point, then we know that the other agents would have taken longer than $r_{N \setminus \{i\}}$ without agent $i$. This follows from the consistency property: all of the computations that the other agents did, they also would have done in the world without $i$. What we do not know is how much more time they would have needed from that point on. The idea behind ChPE is to take the expectation only over this part. Specifically, if machine $i$ is the one to complete the job, it receives the RPG term $-(r_N − r_i)$, plus the following $h$ term:

$$h_i(r_{N \setminus \{i\}}, f_{−i}) = E_{T_{−i} \sim f_{−i}}[T_{N \setminus \{i\}} | T_{N \setminus \{i\}} > r_{N \setminus \{i\}}] = r_{N \setminus \{i\}} + E_{T_{−i} \sim f_{−i}}[T_{N \setminus \{i\}} | T_{N \setminus \{i\}} > r_{N \setminus \{i\}}]$$

On the other hand, if machine $i$ is not the one to complete the job, its total payment is 0, because in this case, the $h$ term is

$$h_i(r_{N \setminus \{i\}}, f_{−i}) = E_{T_{−i} \sim f_{−i}}[T_{N \setminus \{i\}} | T_{N \setminus \{i\}} = r_{N \setminus \{i\}}] = (r_N − r_i)$$

which exactly cancels out the RPG term.

No Dominant-Strategies Truthfulness

In this section, we show that our mechanisms do not attain dominant-strategies truthfulness, which is a stronger notion than ex-post truthfulness. Intuitively, this is because if a player knows that another player has (for whatever reason) misreported, the former can have an incentive to misreport as well to “correct” for the latter’s misreport. This constitutes a violation of dominant-strategies truthfulness, because this concept requires that truthful behavior is optimal regardless of what others do. It does not, however, violate ex-post truthfulness, because the example presupposes that another player is misreporting, which is assumed not to be the case in ex-post equilibrium.

Proposition 4. None of RPG, ChE, and ChPE is truthful in dominant strategies.

Proof. To show that a mechanism is not truthful in dominant strategies, it suffices to find an instance where the following holds. Given that one player decides to deviate and lie, the best response for another player is to deviate as well.

Assume that the true distributions of the machines are the same as described in the proof of Proposition 2. Suppose that machine 2 (for whatever reason) lies and reports a distribution with hazard rate $\zeta_2(1) = 0.5$. In doing so, it gets to compute before machine 1, but otherwise the schedule is unchanged. If machine 1 is aware of this, it has an incentive to also lie and report $\zeta_1(1) = 0.6$, so that the mechanism again produces the allocation that is optimal with respect to the true distributions. This is precisely because the mechanisms in the statement of the proposition align the machine’s utility with the social welfare.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>$\zeta_i(1)$</th>
<th>$\zeta_i(t)$ ($t \geq 2$)</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>machine $i=1$</td>
<td>0.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>machine $i=2$</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>machine $i=3$</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Under RPG, the situation on the left-hand side results in an expected utility for machine 1 of $−(1−0.3)·1−(0.3·1+ (1−0.3)0.4·1+(1−0.3)(1−0.4)0.2·2+…]$, where again the first term corresponds to 1’s processing cost and the second to its payment. Note that, because this is RPG rather than...
Ex-Post Truthfulness

We now show that RPG, ChE, and ChPE are ex-post truthful, that is, it is an ex-post equilibrium for each machine to report truthfully, to process when it is supposed to, and to announce a solution as soon as it is found. We first need the following lemma in order to deal with the case of ChPE.

**Lemma 2.** In the ChPE mechanism, assuming truthful behavior by the other machines, machine \( i \) cannot affect the expected value of its \( h_3 \) term, \( E[h_3(r_{N \setminus \{i\}}, \hat{f}_{-i})] \), whether by lying, failing to compute, or withholding the solution.

**Proof.** Recall that in ChPE,

\[
h_i(r_{N \setminus \{i\}}, \hat{f}_{-i}) = r_{N \setminus \{i\}} + E_{T_{-i} \sim \hat{f}_{-i}}[T_{N \setminus \{i\}} - r_{N \setminus \{i\}} | T_{N \setminus \{i\}} > r_{N \setminus \{i\}}]
\]

if \( i \) finishes, and \( h_i(r_{N \setminus \{i\}}, \hat{f}_{-i}) = r_{N \setminus \{i\}} \) otherwise. (We can ignore the RPG payment term throughout this proof.) Machine \( i \) in fact can do things to affect the realization of its \( h_3 \) payment. For example, if it has finished the task, it can announce at that point and get the corresponding \( h_3 \) payment; alternatively, it can choose to never announce it and wait for another machine to finish, in which case it might get a lower \( h_3 \) payment if another machine finishes the task shortly after, or a higher \( h_3 \) payment if it takes the other machines much longer. That is, it can interrupt the other agents’ processing and receive the expected value of their remaining processing time, or it can let them continue to process and receive the realization of their remaining processing time.

It is straightforward to check that in fact any manipulation that \( i \) has available can only affect the \( h_3 \) payment by changing the distribution over the time at which \( i \) would interrupt the others’ processing by announcing it has finished the task (thereby receiving the expectation of the others’ remaining processing time rather than the realization). Let us grant our manipulator \( i \) even more power, allowing it to choose the precise point \( t \) at which to interrupt the others’ processing. (\( t \) here is according to the other machines’ combined “clock”, i.e., it measures how much time the other machines have processed, but not itself.) Let \( \pi^i_t \) denote the \( h_3 \) payment \( i \) receives given that it interrupts at \( t \). We obtain:

\[
\pi^i_t(T_{-i}) = \begin{cases} 
T_{-i} & \text{if } T_{-i} \leq t \\
t + E[T_{-i} - t | T_{-i} > t] & \text{otherwise}
\end{cases}
\]

The first case materializes if another player finishes the computation before \( t \), and the second otherwise. (Note that this notation is implicitly using the fact that the others report truthfully—otherwise the expectation in the second case should be taken according to the reported distribution.) Now, we note that for any \( t \), we have

\[
E[\pi^i_t(T_{-i})] = P(T_{-i} \leq t)E[T_{-i} | T_{-i} \leq t] + P(T_{-i} > t)E[T_{-i} | T_{-i} > t] = E[T_{-i}].
\]

Hence, \( i \) cannot affect the expectation of its \( h_3 \) payment.  

We can now prove the main positive result.

**Theorem 2.** Any direct-revelation scheduling mechanism where \( i \) receives the RPG payment plus an \( h \) term whose expectation \( i \) cannot affect is ex-post truthful. Hence, RPG, ChE, and ChPE are all ex-post truthful.

**Proof.** Because machines are assumed to be risk-neutral, they care only about the expectation of their \( h \) term, and since they cannot affect this, the \( h_i \) term does not affect their incentives at all. Hence, it suffices to prove that RPG is ex-post truthful. In RPG, machine \( i \)’s utility is \(-r_i - (r_N - r_i) = r_N \). Hence, the best that \( i \) can hope for is the social planner’s solution that minimizes the expected processing time. But, machine \( i \) can achieve exactly this by behaving truthfully, because the mechanism chooses the social planner’s solution for the reported distributions, and in ex-post equilibrium, everyone else can be assumed to behave truthfully.

Additional Properties of Proposed Mechanisms

While the ex-post truthfulness of RPG, ChE, and ChPE would seem to indicate that these mechanisms are superior to EPG and EC, we need to consider other properties as well. For example, one might prefer EC to RPG simply because the fact that the latter demands payments from the machines is entirely unpalatable. Then again, ChPE obtains the best of both worlds in this regard. In this section, we explore these additional properties, driven in large part by the \( h \) functions, in more detail.

The desirable properties that we consider here are:

- **No negative payments (NNP):** the agents receive payments that are never negative.
- **No negative expected payments (NNEP):** for any profile of (true) distributions, each agent’s expected payment is non-negative assuming truthful behavior (even if the realization can sometimes be negative).
- **Individual rationality (IR):** for any profile of (true) distributions, each agent’s expected utility is non-negative assuming truthful behavior (even if the realization can sometimes be negative).
- **Zero payment upon failure (ZPUF):** a machine that is not the one to finish the job always gets payment 0.

Naturally, NNP implies NNEP. IR also implies NNEP: contrapositively, if an agent has a negative expected payment for some profile, its expected utility must also be negative, because its processing costs can only bring its expected utility down further. A stronger version of IR—where even an
agent’s realized utility is never negative—seems too much to ask for, for the following reason. Presumably, Clarke-type mechanisms should give an agent who has extremely low hazard rates, and thus will never be asked to process, an expected utility of zero. But if the mechanism satisfies this stronger notion of IR, such an agent would have nothing to lose, and presumably something to gain, from reporting higher hazard rates and participating in the processing. The same issue would occur for a stronger notion of truthfulness where an agent never regrets telling the truth even after learning $T_N$. 

**Proposition 5.** (a) EPG and RPG do not satisfy any of NNP, NNEP, IR, and ZPUF.
(b) EC and ChPE satisfy NNP (and hence NNEP). ChE satisfies NNEP, but not NNP.
(c) EC, ChE, and ChPE satisfy IR.
(d) ChPE satisfies ZPUF; EC and ChE do not.

**Proof.** (a) Any machine that is not sure to finish the job completely by itself will have a negative expected payment, implying that NNEP (and hence NNP and IR) are violated. A machine that does not finish must also have a negative payment, so ZPUF is violated.

(b) For EC, because the schedule that minimizes expected processing time is always chosen, $i$’s being present can never increase the expected processing time of the other agents $-i$. For ChPE, $i$’s payment is either 0, or

$$\text{for } i \in \{1, \ldots, n\},\ E_{T_i \sim f_i, \ldots, T_n \sim f_n}[\sum_{i \neq j} r_N(i) \mid T_N(i) - r_N\{i\} > r_N\{i\}]$$

which must be positive. Finally, for any given profile, assuming truthful behavior, ChE has the same expected payments as EC and ChPE. ChE can have negative realized payments when processing happens to take much longer than expected, which increases $r_N - r_i$ but does not affect $h_i(f_{-i})$.

(c) For any given profile, assuming truthful behavior, an agent $i$ gets the same expected utility in all three of these mechanisms. Hence, WLOG, we can focus on ChE. The expected utility for agent $i$ satisfies

$$u_i(f_1, \ldots, f_n) = E_{T_1 \sim f_1, \ldots, T_n \sim f_n}[-R_i - (R_N - R_i)] + h_i(f_{-i}) = E_{T_1 \sim f_1, \ldots, T_n \sim f_n}[-T_N] + E_{T_1 \sim f_{-i}}[T_N \mid \{i\}] \geq 0.$$ 

The last inequality holds because the schedule always minimizes expected processing time, so having an additional agent available never increases the expected running time.

(d) It is immediate from the definition that ChPE satisfies ZPUF. EC results in positive payments for all machines simultaneously, as long as each one reduces the expected processing time. For ChE, if the job happens to be finished in the first round by some machine, the other machines will receive positive payments.

### Giving Up

So far, we have assumed, for simplicity of exposition, that the task must be completed, and, in order to make this feasible with probability 1, that hazard rates are bounded below by some positive constant. To be able to drop these assumptions, we must say something about what the cost of not finishing the task is. Let us call this cost $\Phi$. This could also be interpreted as having a backup methodology (e.g., exhaustive search) that is sure to finish the task but very expensive (costing $\Phi$).

Once we admit that not finishing the task has only a finite cost, we must also admit that we may wish to stop processing (go to the backup methodology) even if there are positive hazard rates left. Specifically, under MHR, we stop when the maximum remaining hazard rate $h_{\text{max}}$ is less than $\frac{1}{\Phi}$. This is because if we process exactly one more unit of time, the cost of doing so is 1 and the expected return is $h_{\text{max}} \Phi$. Moreover, because of MHR, if $h_{\text{max}}$ is currently less than $\frac{1}{\Phi}$ then it will remain so forever; hence, if it is not worth it to process exactly one more unit of time, it is not worth it to process any additional positive amount of time.

The expression for social welfare thus becomes $-r_N - (1 - x)\Phi$, where $r_N$ is the total amount of time processed (which is no longer equal to $T_N$ in the case where processing is stopped before finishing the task), and $x \in \{0, 1\}$ indicates whether the task has been completed. It is straightforward to modify the material in the paper to deal with this more general case.

### Future Research

Our work leaves several directions for future research. One is to fully characterize the class of mechanisms that are ex-post truthful: is it the case that in every such mechanism, each machine receives the RPG payment, plus an $h$ term whose expectation it cannot affect? Another is to find an axiomatic characterization of the ChPE mechanism. We conjecture that dominant-strategies truthfulness is unattainable under minimal assumptions.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Efficient</th>
<th>DS truthful</th>
<th>Ex-post truthful</th>
<th>No incentive to miscompute</th>
<th>ZPUF</th>
<th>IR</th>
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References


