Congestion and Cost Allocation for Distributed Networks: An Experimental Study *

Yan Chen  
School of Information, University of Michigan  
1075 Beal Avenue, Ann Arbor, MI 48109-2112.  
Email: yanchen@umich.edu

Laura Razzolini  
Department of Economics  
University of Mississippi, 326 Holman Hall, University, MS 38677  
Email: laura@olemiss.edu  

April 10, 2003

Abstract

This paper reports an experimental study of two prominent congestion and cost allocation mechanisms for distributed networks. We study the serial (or fair queueing) and the average cost pricing (or FIFO) mechanisms under two different treatments: a complete information treatment and a limited information treatment designed to simulate distributed networks. Experimental results show that the serial mechanism performs significantly better than the average cost pricing mechanism in all treatments in terms of efficiency, predictability measured as frequency of equilibrium play, and the speed of convergence. Monte Carlo simulations of a calibrated learning model show that the results are robust to changes in the environment.

Keywords: serial mechanism, cost sharing, experiment
JEL Classification: C91, D83

*We thank Simon Anderson, Narine Badasyan, Catherine Eckel, Edna Lohman, seminar participants at Michigan, Virginia, Virginia Tech, ESA 2001 (Tucson, AZ) and Public Choice Society meetings (2002) for helpful comments. We thank Peter Katuscak, Belal Sabki, Pragya Sen, Brian Chan and Lisa Robinson for excellent research assistance, and Jim Leady for programming for the experiment. The research support provided by NSF grant SES-0079001 to Chen, SES-9973731 to Razzolini, and a grant from the Office of Naval Research to Razzolini are gratefully acknowledged. Any remaining errors are our own.
The Internet has become increasingly important in global telecommunications. In distributed networks such as the Internet, multiple agents share the same network link. Each agent controls the rate at which she is transmitting data. If the sum of the transmission rates is greater than the total link capacity, then the link becomes congested and the agents’ packets experience delays. Most current Internet routers use a FIFO packet scheduling algorithm, where all packets are serviced on a first-come-first-serve basis. One agent’s usage can affect the quality of service of other agents. Aggressive users can get more than an equal share of these shared facilities. For example, agents who modify their Transmission Control Protocol implementation to be less responsive when congestion is detected can obtain much larger shares of the bandwidth (Demers et al., 1990). In contrast, the Fair Queueing packet scheduling algorithm leads to congestion allocations such that an agent’s average queue is independent of transmission rates higher than her own. The latter has been proposed as an alternative to the former, based on theoretical and simulation results (Stoica, Shenker and Zhang, 1998). The new generation of Cisco 7200, 3600 and 2600 routers have both the FIFO and Fair Queueing options. In this paper we evaluate the performance of these two algorithms using laboratory experiments.

Congestion allocation in distributed networks belongs to the more general class of cost sharing problems. In a wide variety of real world situations a group of agents share a common resource, such as computing facilities, secretarial support and lab facilities within an organization. A cost-sharing mechanism distributes the service and allocates the corresponding costs to each agent. The FIFO packet scheduling algorithm corresponds to the average cost pricing mechanism (Shenker, 1990) where an agent’s cost share is proportional to her own demand, while the Fair Queueing algorithm corresponds to the serial cost sharing mechanism. Variants of both mechanisms have been used in different contexts to allocate resources and costs. In some situations agents know the rules of the game as well as each other’s preferences fairly well. In other situations there is much less information regarding the agents’ true preferences.

Aadland and Kolpin (1998) provide an empirical and axiomatic analysis of cost-sharing arrangements of irrigation ditches located in south-central Montana. In their sample, a typical ditch begins at the headgate and then continues on a sequential path through the lands of each rancher using the main ditch. Ranchers’ private ditches branch off from the main ditch and transport water to their land. The costs associated with the main ditch are shared among the ranchers. Kolpin and Aadland (2001) find that the cost sharing rules employed on these ditches are variations of the average and serial cost sharing mechanisms. A rule is in the average class if all agents pay according to an identical fixed “rate”, which may be defined on a per capita basis, per irrigated acre basis, etc. A serial rule partitions the main ditch into “a sequence of segments such that all agents require the first segment to be operational in order to receive water, all but the first agent on the ditch additionally require the second segment to be operational, ... . Each segment is then treated like a separate ditch whose costs are covered by having all agents requiring its use pay an identical fixed rate.” (Kolpin and Aadland, 2001) An agent’s total cost share is the sum of his obligations on each of these individual segments. This example provides a more traditional setting where the ranchers know the rules of
the game as well as each other’s demand fairly well.

In other situations agents might not know the preferences of other agents. Large and complex organizations, such as the U.S. Navy, face the same continuous challenge of allocating commonly shared resources efficiently and effectively. Navy Training Programs constitute a large expenditure component for the Navy. In 1996, the Navy spent over $13.9 billion to train in excess of 1 million students. These students attended approximately 10,000 different courses which were offered several times a year at more than 300 Navy locations. The objective of such training programs is to provide the Navy with a force qualified to perform a variety of tasks and missions. Navy Training Programs can be viewed as a shared good that different agencies within the Navy demand and use at the same time. The decision process regarding whether an individual should attend a training school and when this should occur is carried out jointly by an enlisted community manager (who determines the individuals who should fill different jobs in the Navy) and a detailer (who assigns individuals to different schools). The allocation problem is complicated when these shared resources are scarce. Whenever demand exceeds supply and we have to ration the demanders of a service, the subjects will have to wait. Such a cost for waiting will have to be divided among the users of the service. The allocation problem can be further aggravated if demanders overstate their case for desired resources in order to ensure access. Therefore, the two major problems facing the decision makers are: (1) How to determine the true demand for different types of training by different users in the Navy, and (2) how to efficiently allocate the limited supply of slots in training schools. The common first-come-first-serve queueing algorithm, which is equivalent to the average cost pricing mechanism, relegates all congestion control to the origin, since the order of arrival determines who goes to the training program and when. Under this mechanism a single unit with a very high demand can capture a large fraction of the available slots in training schools. This is a typical problem of the average cost pricing mechanism that it tends to favor high demanders and, therefore, it could induce over-demand. Alternatively, we could divide the total waiting cost according to the serial cost sharing mechanism, which has better theoretical properties. For example it is in each individual’s best interest to reveal truthfully their actual demands. When choosing the appropriate mechanism, it is important to assess the actual performance of these different mechanisms under limited information.

Most of the theoretical literature has focused on the axiomatic characterization of these mechanisms (e.g., Moulin and Shenker, 1994; Friedman and Moulin, 1999) and their static properties in a complete information setting with synchronous actions. However, as Friedman and Shenker (1998) pointed out, in a distributed system¹ such as the Internet where agents have very limited a priori information about other agents and the payoff structure and where there is no synchronization of actions, traditional solution concepts that we use to characterize these mechanisms, such as Nash equilibrium or even the serially undominated set², might not be achieved as a result of learning. They propose new solution concepts for distributed systems describing convergence for learning algorithms satisfying certain theoretical properties.

¹Following Friedman and Shenker (1998), a system is called a distributed system "because the users are geographically dispersed and are accessing the resource through the network.” The Internet is a prominent example.

²Serially undominated set is the set of outcomes of a strategic game that survives iterated elimination of strictly dominated actions.
We are aware of five experimental studies of cost sharing mechanisms. Chen (forthcoming) studies the serial and average cost pricing mechanisms under complete information as well as limited information when there are two types of agents. She found that the performance of the two mechanisms are statistically indistinguishable under complete information. Under limited information, however, the serial mechanism performs robustly better than the average cost pricing mechanism in terms of frequency of equilibrium play and system efficiency. Chen and Khoroshilov (2000) study the learning dynamics in these cost sharing games and other games under limited information. Razzolini et al. (1999) investigate the performance of the serial mechanism with each human subject against three computerized players, where each human player knows his own cost share and payoff structure but has no information about the opponents’ payoff structures. Their information condition is in between the complete information and limited information setting in Chen (forthcoming). While in Chen’s experiment, the subjects maintain their preference parameter throughout the entire experiment, in Razzolini et al.’s experiment, the subjects’ preference parameters change in each period. This implies that in each period the allocation mechanism must converge to a different Nash equilibrium allocation. Razzolini et al. (1999) implement the serial mechanism both as a sequential game and as a simultaneous normal form game. They found that the serial mechanism leads to almost efficient allocations, and even though more easy to understand and implement, the simultaneous move treatment does not lead to a better overall performance. Chen (forthcoming) uses a payoff table to explain both mechanisms, which is feasible for the serial mechanism with only two types of players. When the number of types increase, the serial mechanism becomes more challenging to implement in the laboratory, because the dimension of payoff tables increases with each additional type. With more than two types one needs to find alternative ways to implement the mechanism. Razzolini et al. (1999) has four different types, but only one of them is a human player, thus the strategic interaction between different types are simplified. Each of the two studies highlights different aspects of the cost sharing mechanisms. They present the first steps in understanding how these mechanisms work.

Gailmard and Palfrey (2000) report experiments for the provision of excludable threshold public goods and compare the serial cost sharing mechanism with voluntary cost sharing with proportional rebates and with no rebates. They found that voluntary cost sharing with rebates outperforms serial on welfare grounds, which in turn outperforms voluntary cost sharing with no rebates. One possible reason for the difference between Gailmard and Palfrey’s results and the two previous studies might be that Gailmard and Palfrey (2000) use an excludable threshold public goods, while Chen (forthcoming) and Razzolini et al. (1999) use multiple levels of private goods. Rapoport et al. (2001) report an experimental study of a large-scale queueing game with the FIFO queue discipline (i.e., average cost sharing mechanism). Their results show strong support for mixed strategy equilibrium play on the aggregate level but not on the individual level.

This paper is a natural extension of Chen (forthcoming) and Razzolini et al. (1999). In this paper we design an experiment to evaluate the serial and the average cost pricing mechanism in complete information environment, and a more challenging environment with limited information. In our environment there are twelve players of four different types. Thus, the environment is more complex than the two earlier studies.
The goal of this paper is to assess the performance of the two mechanisms in various settings, to study how human subjects learn in these different settings, and whether and how the learning dynamics leads to convergence to stage game Nash equilibrium.

The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the theoretical properties of the serial (hereafter shortened as SRL) and average cost pricing (hereafter shortened as ACP) mechanisms. Section 3 presents the experimental design. Section 4 compares the performance of the mechanisms under complete information and limited information. Section 5 discusses the robustness of the experimental results with respect to changes in the environment by calibrating a learning model and using the calibrated model to forecast performance in other environments. Section 6 concludes the paper.

2 The Serial and ACP Mechanisms - Theoretical Properties

Let \( N = \{1, 2, \ldots, n\} \) be a group of agents sharing a one-input, one-output technology. Each of the \( n \) agents announces his demand \( q_i \) of output. Each agent gets her demand \( q_i \) and pays a cost share, \( x_i \). Note \( x_i \) is the total cost agent \( i \) pays. In the irrigation example, \( q_i \) corresponds to the total amount of maintenance of the main ditch demanded by agent \( i \), while \( x_i \) is what agent \( i \) pays to get the maintenance done. In the example of Internet routers, \( q_i \) is agent \( i \)'s data transmission rate, while \( x_i \) is the congestion, i.e., the average queue experienced by agent \( i \). In the example of the Navy training programs, \( q_i \) is the number of seats requested in the school, and \( x_i \) is the waiting cost each unit must incur. In all three case, \( x_i \) is the reduction in agent \( i \)'s utility due to congestion. Let \( q_1 \leq q_2 \leq \cdots \leq q_n \). The cost function is denoted by \( C \), which is strictly convex. A cost-sharing mechanism must allocate the total cost \( C(\sum_i q_i) \) among the \( n \) agents.

The serial mechanism, originally introduced by Shenker (1990), was analyzed by Moulin and Shenker (1992) in the context of cost and surplus sharing with complete information. The mechanism can be characterized by four properties: unique Nash equilibrium at all profiles\(^3\), anonymity (the name of the agents does not matter), monotonicity (an agent’s cost share increases when she demands more output) and smoothness (an agent’s cost share is a continuously differentiable function of the vector of demands). Among agents endowed with convex, continuous and monotonic preferences,

the serial mechanism is the only cost sharing rule which is dominance-solvable and its unique Nash equilibrium is also robust to coalitional deviations when agents cannot transfer outputs.

Under the serial mechanism, agent 1 (with the lowest demand) pays \((1/n)th\) of the cost of producing \( nq_1 \), \( x_1^s = C(nq_1)/n \). Agent 2 pays agent 1’s cost share plus \(1/(n-1)\)th of the incremental cost from \( nq_1 \) to \( (n-1)q_2 + q_1 \), i.e.,

\[
x_2^s = \frac{C(nq_1)}{n} + \frac{C(q_1 + (n-1)q_2) - C(nq_1)}{n-1}.
\]

And so on. Let \( q^0 = 0; \quad q^1 = nq_1; \quad q^2 = q_1 + (n-1)q_2; \cdots; \quad q^i = q_1 + \cdots + q_{i-1} + (n+1-i)q_i; \cdots; \quad q^n = \]

\(^3\)Assume agents have convex, continuous and monotonic preferences.
\[ \sum_i q_i. \] Then the general formula for agent \( i \)'s cost share is given below,

\[
x^s_i(c, q) = \sum_{k=1}^i \frac{C(q^k) - C(q^{k-1})}{n + 1 - k}, \quad \text{for all } i = 1, \cdots, n.
\]

Therefore, an agent’s cost share under the serial mechanism is only affected by her own demand and those whose demands are lower than hers. In other words, an agent’s cost share is independent of demands higher than her own.

Like the serial mechanism, the average cost pricing mechanism satisfies anonymity, monotonicity and smoothness. It is the only method that is robust to arbitrage, i.e., agents cannot benefit from merging or splitting their demands. In contrast to the serial mechanism, the normal form game induced by the average cost pricing mechanism is in general not dominance-solvable, nor does it have a unique equilibrium at all profiles when agents have convex, continuous and monotonic preferences.

When agent \( i \) demands \( q_i \) amount of output, the general formula for agent \( i \)'s cost share under the average cost pricing mechanism is given by

\[
x^a_i(c, q) = \frac{q_i}{\sum_k q_k} \cdot C(\sum_k q_k), \quad \text{for all } i = 1, \cdots, n.
\]

Therefore, under ACP an agent’s cost share is proportional to her demand. It is affected by her own demand, and the sum of all other agents’ demands.

There is no systematic efficiency comparison between the two mechanisms. In general there exists no differentiable and monotonic cost sharing mechanism where all Nash equilibrium outcomes are first best Pareto optimal at all preference profiles. Moulin and Shenker (1992) provide a definition of second best efficiency\(^4\) and show that the serial mechanism yields a second best efficient equilibrium while ACP does not.

A particularly interesting question is the performance of the two mechanisms in distributed systems where users are geographically dispersed and are accessing the resource through the network. Friedman and Shenker (1998) address the issue of learning and implementation in distributed systems. They argue that when agents have very limited \textit{a priori} information about the other players and the payoff structure, standard solution concepts like Nash equilibrium or even the

---

\(^4\)“For an arbitrary cost sharing mechanism \( \xi \), say that \((q_1, \cdots, q_n)\) is a Nash equilibrium outcome at some utility profile. We ask if there is another vector of demands \((q'_1, \cdots, q'_n)\) such that at the corresponding allocation dictated by the mechanism \( \xi \), no one is worse off and someone is better off than at the equilibrium allocation corresponding to \((q_1, \cdots, q_n)\). If no such vector of demands exists, we call our equilibrium second best efficient.” Moulin and Shenker (1992, p.1025)
serially undominated set are not necessarily achieved as a result of learning in the network setting. Therefore, new solution concepts, such as the serially unoverwhelmed set and the Stackelberg undominated set are proposed. Loosely speaking, one action *overwhelms* another if all payoffs, over all sets of other players’ actions, for the one are greater than all payoffs, over all sets of other players’ actions, for the other. Therefore, if action U overwhelms action D, then U dominates D, but the converse is not true.

\[
\begin{array}{c|cc}
\text{Player 2} & \text{L} & \text{R} \\
\hline
\text{Player 1} & \pi_1(UL), \pi_2(UL) & \pi_1(UR), \pi_2(UR) \\
& \pi_1(DL), \pi_2(DL) & \pi_1(DR), \pi_2(DR)
\end{array}
\]

For example, in the above 2×2 game, action U dominates D if \(\pi_1(UL) \geq \pi_1(DL)\) and \(\pi_1(UR) \geq \pi_1(DR)\); action U overwhelms D if \(\min\{\pi_1(UL), \pi_1(UR)\} \geq \max\{\pi_1(DL), \pi_1(DR)\}\). The *serially unoverwhelmed set* is the set remaining after iterated elimination of overwhelmed actions. One main result of Friedman and Shenker (1998) is that reasonable learners converge to the serially unoverwhelmed set. In comparison, Milgrom and Roberts (1990) showed that adaptive learners converge to the serially undominated set. A game is *D-solvable* if iterated elimination of dominated strategies leads to a single eventual outcome. A game is *O-solvable* if iterated elimination of overwhelmed strategies leads to a single eventual outcome. Among the cost sharing mechanisms, the serial mechanism is O-solvable while ACP is not.

### 3 Experimental Design

The experimental design reflects both theoretical and technical considerations. The goal of the design is to compare the performance of the SRL and ACP mechanisms in two different settings: a complete information setting that tests the prediction of dominance-solvability, and a more challenging network setting to compare the performance of the two mechanisms and to assess the plausibility of the new solution concepts. The economic environment and experimental procedures are discussed in the sections below.

**3.1 The Economic Environment**

In a simple environment to test the serial and ACP mechanism under various treatments, agents are endowed with linear preferences \(\pi_i(x_i, q) = \alpha_i q_i + \omega_i - x_i\), where \(\alpha_i\) is agent \(i\)’s marginal utility for the output, \(\omega_i\) is agent \(i\)’s lump-sum endowment and \(x_i\) is her cost share. The cost function is chosen to be quadratic.

---

5 See Friedman and Shenker (1998) for a precise definition.

6 The key components of a reasonable learner are optimization, monotonicity and responsiveness. See Friedman and Shenker (1998).

7 This is proved in Theorem 8 in Friedman and Shenker (1998).
Consider a four-player game with \( \alpha_1 \leq \alpha_2 \leq \alpha_3 \leq \alpha_4 \). Under the serial mechanism, the cost share for agent 1 is \( x_1^s = C(4q_1)/4 \). Agent 2’s cost share is \( x_2^s = x_1^s + (C(q_1 + 3q_2) - C(4q_1))/3 \). Agent 3’s cost share is \( x_3^s = x_2^s + (C(q_1 + q_2 + 2q_3) - C(q_1 + 3q_2))/2 \). Agent 4’s cost share is \( x_4^s = x_3^s + (C(q_1 + q_2 + q_3 + q_4) - C(q_1 + q_2 + 2q_3))/2 \). When agents maximize their utility over a continuous strategy space, the unique, dominance-solvable Nash equilibrium is characterized by

\[
q_1^s = \frac{\alpha_1}{8}, \quad q_2^s = \frac{\alpha_2}{6} - \frac{\alpha_1}{24}, \quad q_3^s = \frac{\alpha_3}{4} - \frac{\alpha_1}{24} - \frac{\alpha_2}{12}, \quad \text{and} \quad q_4^s = \frac{\alpha_4}{2} - \frac{\alpha_1}{24} - \frac{\alpha_2}{12} - \frac{\alpha_3}{4}.
\]

For the ACP mechanism, the cost shares of each of the four agents are

\[
x_i^a = \frac{q_i}{\sum_{i=1}^{4} q_i} C(\sum_{i=1}^{4} q_i) = q_i (\sum_{i=1}^{4} q_i).
\]

Even though the normal form game induced by ACP is in general not dominance solvable, nor does it have a unique equilibrium at all profiles, in our experimental environment it is dominance solvable and has a unique equilibrium when the strategy space is continuous. The unique, dominance-solvable Nash equilibrium is characterized by

\[
q_i^a = \frac{4\alpha_i}{5} - \frac{\sum_{j \neq i} \alpha_j}{5}, \forall i.
\]

The mechanisms are implemented as normal form games with a discrete strategy space for each player, \( \{0, 1, \cdots, 19, 20\} \). Parameters are chosen to ensure: (1) With a continuous strategy space, the SRL game is both D-solvable and O-solvable, while the ACP game is D-solvable but not O-solvable; (2) Nash equilibrium strategies are all integers; (3) most of the payoffs are positive in both normal form games; (4) lump-sum payments are allocated in a way that the sum of all players’ Nash equilibrium payoffs in the SRL and ACP games are the same with a continuous strategy space. This enables us to make efficiency comparisons between the two mechanisms.\(^8\) (5) Within each game the lump-sum payoffs are allocated such that the equilibrium payoffs are not too skewed among different types of players.

Table 1 reports the parameters, equilibrium quantities and payoffs for the two mechanisms. Note that we use Blue for player 1, Green for player 2, Red for player 3 and Yellow for player 4 in the instructions (see Appendix A). In the columns under Equilibrium Quantities, the SRL mechanism still has a unique Nash equilibrium as is the case with a continuous strategy space, \( (6, 7, 8, 9) \). Under ACP, however, apart from the unique Nash equilibrium with a continuous strategy space, \( (4, 10, 14, 16) \), there are eighteen additional Nash equilibria when the strategy space is discrete.

\(^8\)Note that generically in the same economic environment in Nash equilibrium either the SRL or the ACP game yields higher aggregate payoffs, making it inappropriate to do an efficiency comparison.
Table 2 lists all nineteen Nash equilibria for the ACP game. They are organized by the equilibrium quantities from the smallest demander to the largest demander. Equilibrium number 10 (in bold) is the original Nash equilibrium of the continuous game. Note all 19 equilibria have the same aggregate demand, \( \sum_{i=1}^{4} q_i^a = 44 \). The last column lists the aggregate equilibrium payoffs in decreasing order. Next we show that multiple equilibria as a result of discretization is a generic property of the average cost pricing mechanism, regardless of the step size for discretization. Let \( D \) be a discrete strategy space such that the equilibrium of the continuous strategy space, \( \{q^*_i\}_{i\in N} \in D \). Let \( s > 0 \) be the step size in \( D \). The following proposition characterizes the Nash equilibria of the ACP mechanism with a discrete strategy space \( D \).

**Proposition 1** In environment \( E \) under the ACP mechanism, if \( \{q^*_i\}_{i\in N} \) is the unique Nash equilibrium of the continuous game, then \( \{\bar{q}_1, \ldots, \bar{q}_n | \bar{q}_i \in \{q^*_i - s, q^*_i, q^*_i + s \} \) and \( \sum \bar{q}_i = \sum q^*_i ; \forall i \in N, \forall s > 0 \} \) are all Nash equilibria of the discrete game.

**Proof:** see Appendix B.

Even though Proposition 1 only deals with our experimental environment of linear preferences and quadratic cost functions, multiple equilibria with discretization is a generic problem with the ACP mechanism. We will discuss the multiple equilibria problem in other environments in Section 5.

### 3.2 Experimental Procedures

We implemented a \( 2 \times 2 \) design by varying the mechanisms and information conditions. We conducted five independent sessions for each of the four treatments. Each session had twelve subjects and last for fifty rounds. Players always kept their own type. For a baseline comparison, we conducted ten sessions of the SRL and ACP mechanisms under complete information with the random matching protocol (hereafter shortened as SRL\(_c\) and ACP\(_c\)). Under complete information, each player was informed of the payoff matrix, the structure of the game, matching protocols, the quantities chosen and the corresponding payoffs earned by all players in all rounds. This pair of treatments were designed to compare the performance of the two mechanisms as one-shot games under complete information. The natural solution concept for these treatments is dominance-solvability. To evaluate the possibility of applying these mechanisms to distributed systems such as the Internet, we designed a pair of limited information treatments. Learning in distributed systems is characterized by the feature that players might have extremely limited information. They often do not know the payoff functions, nor do they know how their payoffs depend on the actions of others, probably due to the lack of information about the detailed nature of the resources itself. Therefore, in the limited information treatments, the only information players had was their own action and the resulting own payoffs. In the limited information treatments, players were again randomly re-matched into groups of four in each round (hereafter shortened as SRL\(_l\) and ACP\(_l\)).

Computerized experiments were conducted at the RCGD Laboratory at the University of Michigan in July and August, 2001. We conducted twenty independent sessions. Subjects were students from the
University of Michigan. A total of 240 subjects participated in the experiment. No subject was used in more than one session.

Table 3 lists the features of each session, including session number, date experiments were conducted, mechanisms implemented, and information conditions under each treatment. At the beginning of each session subjects randomly drew a PC terminal number. Then each of them was seated in front of the corresponding terminal, and given the instructions. After the instructions were read aloud, subjects were required to finish the Review Questions in the complete information treatment, which were designed to test their understanding of the instructions. Since the instructions for the limited information case were straightforward, they were not given Review Questions. Afterwards the experimenter checked answers and answered questions. In all complete information sessions the instruction period was within 25 minutes and the entire session took about one hour. In all limited information sessions the instruction period was within 10 minutes and the entire session took approximately 40 minutes. There was no practice round in any session. The average earning was $19.03.

Instructions for the experiments are in Appendix A. Experimental data are available from the authors upon request. Note that in the limited information treatments, players had extremely limited information - they were told that they were in a game, the game length and their strategy space. At the end of each round each player was informed of his own choice in the previous round and his own payoff corresponding to his previous round’s choice of quantity. They had no information about the payoff matrix, nor whom they were playing with.

4 Experimental Results

In this section, we compare the performance of the two mechanisms under the complete and limited information conditions. We first examine the efficiency under each treatment. We then examine the level and speed of convergence to Nash equilibrium.

Although there is no theoretical systematic efficiency comparison between the two mechanisms in general, in this experiment we can make efficiency comparison between the two mechanisms, since we give each player a lump sum payment such that the equilibrium aggregate payoffs for both mechanisms are the same. Group efficiency is calculated by taking the ratio of the sum of the actual earnings of all subjects in a session and the Pareto-optimal earnings of the group without lump-sum payments. Note that in this experimental setting the Pareto optimal payoff without lump sum payments is 881 at strategy four-tuple \((0, 0, 9, 20)\), which is obtained through an exhaustive grid search over the entire strategy space.\(^9\) As a benchmark, the equilibrium aggregate payoff for both mechanisms is 850, which yields an efficiency of 96.48%. We use \(Ef\) for efficiency.

\(^9\)Given the linear utility functions used in our environment, there is no analytical solution to the joint optimization problem, which searches for the Pareto optimal vector of demands.
RESULT 1 (Efficiency: Comparison of the Two Mechanisms) : *The efficiency of the SRL mechanism is significantly higher than that of the ACP mechanism under both the complete information and the limited information treatments.*

SUPPORT: Table 4 reports the efficiency of each session under each treatment. Permutation tests show that

1. \( \text{Ef}(\text{SRL}_c) > \text{Ef}(\text{ACP}_c) \) at a significance level of 0.0040 (one-tailed);
2. \( \text{Ef}(\text{SRL}_l) > \text{Ef}(\text{ACP}_l) \) at a significance level of 0.0040 (one-tailed);
3. \( \text{Ef}(\text{SRL}_l) > \text{Ef}(\text{ACP}_c) \) at a significance level of 0.0040 (one-tailed).

Result 1 says that the SRL mechanism performs robustly better than the ACP mechanism in terms of group efficiency regardless of information conditions. The efficiency of the SRL mechanism under the limited information treatment is significantly higher than the ACP mechanism under the complete information condition.

We then compare the efficiency within each mechanism under different information conditions.

RESULT 2 (Efficiency: Comparison of Information Conditions) : *For both the SRL and ACP mechanisms, the efficiency under complete information is significantly higher than that under limited information.*

SUPPORT: Table 4 reports the efficiency of each independent observation under each treatment. Permutation tests show

1. \( \text{Ef}(\text{SRL}_c) > \text{Ef}(\text{SRL}_l) \) at a significance level of 0.0040 (one-tailed);
2. \( \text{Ef}(\text{ACP}_c) > \text{Ef}(\text{ACP}_l) \) at a significance level of 0.0476 (one-tailed).

This result says that more information is advantageous for aggregate efficiency.

We then explore the predictability of each mechanism by looking at the proportion of equilibrium play. We use the point prediction of \((6, 7, 8, 9)\) for the SRL mechanism, and a set prediction of \(\{3, 4, 5\}, \{9, 10, 11\}, \{13, 14, 15\}, \{15, 16, 17\}\) for the ACP mechanism. Note that the set prediction gives ACP an advantage since it allows combinations of strategies that are not Nash equilibrium to be counted as equilibrium play.

Table 5 tabulates the proportion of Nash equilibrium play in each treatment. We use \(P^e\) to denote the proportion of equilibrium play.
RESULT 3 (Equilibrium Play: Comparison of Mechanisms) : Under complete information, the proportion of Nash equilibrium play under SRL is significantly higher than that under ACP. Under limited information, the proportion of Nash equilibrium play under SRL is weakly higher than that under ACP.

SUPPORT: Table 5 presents the proportion of Nash equilibrium play for each session. Permutation tests under the null hypothesis that the proportion of Nash equilibrium play under SRL is the same as that under ACP show that

1. \( P^e(SRL_c) > P^e(ACP_c) \) at a significance level of 0.0040 (one-tailed);
2. \( P^e(SRL_l) > P^e(ACP_l) \) at a significance level of 0.0833 (one-tailed).

RESULT 4 (Equilibrium Play: Comparison of Information Conditions) : For both the SRL and ACP mechanisms, the proportion of equilibrium play under complete information is significantly higher than that under limited information.

SUPPORT: Table 5 presents the proportion of Nash equilibrium play for each independent observation. Permutation tests show that

1. \( P^e(SRL_c) > P^e(SRL_l) \) at a significance level of 0.0040 (one-tailed);
2. \( P^e(ACP_c) > P^e(ACP_l) \) at a significance level of 0.0040 (one-tailed).

To investigate the speed of convergence and various factors that affect the speed of convergence, we use a random-effects GLS model, where each group consists of all quantities submitted by one individual. In six different specifications, the dependent variable is the distance between actual quantity demanded and equilibrium quantity for the individual player, \( |q^d_i - q^e_i| \). Again, we use the equilibrium point prediction for SRL and the set prediction for ACP. In specifications (1) and (3), we use \( \ln(\text{Period}) \) as the independent variable to investigate whether Period (or time) has a significant effect on the speed of convergence. To examine whether the effects of learning remain constant, decreasing or increasing over time, we used Period, \( \ln(\text{Period}) \), as well as Round\(^2\) as independent variables. Since specifications with \( \ln(\text{Period}) \) overall yields the best fit, we report only these specifications. In specifications (2) and (4), we add a dummy variable for information conditions, DummyI, which is equal to one for complete information and zero for limited information. The interaction of DummyI and \( \ln(\text{Period}) \) captures the effects of more information on the speed of convergence. In specifications (5) and (6), we add a mechanism dummy, DummyM, which is equal to one for SRL and zero for ACP. Compared with the coefficient of \( \ln(\text{Period}) \), the coefficient for the interaction term, DummyM \( \times \ln(\text{Period}) \), captures the difference between SRL and ACP on the speed of convergence. Results of the estimation are reported in Table 6.
RESULT 5 (Speed of Convergence: Information and Mechanism Effects) : Convergence to equilibrium significantly increases over time. More information significantly increases the speed of convergence for ACP. Under both information conditions, convergence is significantly more rapid under SRL.

SUPPORT: Table 6 reports results of random-effects GLS regressions. In specifications (1) and (3), the coefficients of ln (Period) are both negative and highly significant, indicating increased convergence over time. In specifications (2) and (4), the coefficients for DummyI × ln(Period) are both negative, but only significant under ACP. In specifications (5) and (6), the coefficients for DummyM × ln(Period) are both negative and highly significant, indicating more rapid convergence under SRL compared to ACP.

5 Simulation Results: Robustness of Experimental Results in More General Environments

In this section we assess the extent to which the experimental results in Sections 4 depend on the linearity of the utility function and the quadratic cost function employed. We consider nine different environments. For simplicity we use polynomial utility and cost functions. The utility function is
\[ \pi_i(x_i, q) = \alpha_i q_i^b - x_i, \]
where \( \alpha_i \) denotes agent i’s marginal utility for the output, \( b = 0.5, 1, \) and \( 2 \), and \( x_i \) is her cost share. The cost function is chosen to be \( C(q) = q^c \), where \( c = 0.5, 1 \) and \( 2 \). Varying parameters \( b \) and \( c \) will give us nine combinations of concave, linear and convex utility and cost functions. Note that \( b = 1 \) and \( c = 2 \) is the original experimental design.

For the robustness check, it is crucial to use the right learning dynamics. There has been a large literature on learning in games and a growing number of learning algorithms (see Fudenberg and Levine (1998) and Camerer (2002), for a survey). Our interest here is not to compare the performance of various learning models. We thus looked for an algorithm which, when calibrated, closely approximates the observed dynamic paths over fifty rounds. In the following subsections we first report the calibration results using the chosen algorithm. We then report the forecasting results using the calibrated algorithm.

5.1 Calibration

For calibration, we choose to use the payoff assessment learning model, as it is simple, intuitive, and capable of handling both complete and limited information treatments. Furthermore, using the experimental data on cost sharing games reported in Chen (forthcoming), and Van Huyck, Battalio and Rankin’s (1996) data on coordination games, Chen and Khoroshilov (forthcoming) show that the payoff-assessment learning model tracks the data the best among three payoff-based learning models: the payoff-assessment learning model (Sarin and Vahid 1999), a modified experience-weighted attraction learning model (Camerer and Ho 1999) and a simple reinforcement learning model.

The payoff-assessment learning model assumes that a player is a myopic subjective maximizer. She chooses among different strategies only on the basis of the payoff she assesses she would obtain from them.
These assessments do not explicitly take into account her subjective judgements regarding the likelihood of alternate states of the world. At each stage, the player chooses the strategy that she myopically assesses to give her the highest payoff and updates her assessment adaptively. Let $u_j(t)$ denote the subjective assessment of strategy $s_j$ at time $t$, and $\pi_k(t)$ denote the payoff from playing strategy $s_k$ at time $t$. The initial assessment is denoted by $u_j(0)$. Payoff assessments are updated by taking a weighted average of her previous assessments and the objective payoff she actually obtains at time $t$. Let $r$ be the discount factor. If strategy $k$ is chosen at time $t$, then

$$ u_j(t+1) = (1-r)u_j(t) + r\pi_k(t), \forall j. \quad (1) $$

Suppose that at time $t$ the decision-maker experiences zero-mean, symmetrically distributed shocks, $Z_j(t)$ to her assessment of the payoff she would receive from choosing strategy $s_j$, for all $s_j$. Denote the vector of shocks by $Z = (Z_1, \ldots, Z_{12})$, and their realizations at time $t$ by $z(t) = (z_1(t), \ldots, z_{12}(t))$. The decision maker makes choices on the basis of her shock-distorted subjective assessments, denoted by $\tilde{u}(t) = u(t) + Z(t)$. At time $t$ she chooses strategy $s_j$ if

$$ \tilde{u}_j(t) > \tilde{u}_l(t), \forall s_l \neq s_j. \quad (2) $$

Note that mood shocks only affect her choices and not the manner in which assessments are updated. Sarin and Vahid (1999) prove that such a player converges to stochastically choose the strategy that first order stochastically dominates another among the strategies she converges to play with positive probability.

For parameter estimation, we conduct Monte Carlo simulations designed to replicate the characteristics of each of the experimental settings. We then compare the simulated paths with the actual paths of a subset of the experimental data to estimate the parameters which minimize the mean-squared deviation scores.

In each simulation, 10,000 players were created. In each simulation the following steps were taken:

1. Initial values: Since Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests of the round one price distribution by experimental subjects reject the null hypotheses of uniform distribution, we followed the convention in the literature (e.g., Camerer and Ho 2001) and used the actual first round empirical distribution of choices to generate the first round choices.

2. Simulated players were matched into fixed groups, or randomly rematched groups for each period, depending on the treatment.

3. Shocks are drawn from a uniform distribution, $[-a, a]$.

4. The simulated players’ strategies were determined via Eq. (2).

5. Payoffs were determined using the SRL or ACP payoff rule.

6. Assessments were updated according to Eq. (1), using discount factor, $r$. 

14
Table 8 reports the calibrated parameters (discount factor and the interval of mood shocks) for each treatment. Under each mechanism, the interval of mood shocks are much larger under the limited information treatment than the corresponding complete information treatment, indicating more experimentation under limited information.

5.2 Forecasting

In this subsection, we use the calibrated parameters to simulate the dynamic paths of the two mechanisms in nine other environments. Following Chen (forthcoming), we use polynomial utility and cost functions. The utility function is \( \pi_i(x_i, q) = \alpha_i q_i^b - x_i \) are agents’ marginal utility for the output, \( b = 0.5, 1, \) and \( 2, \) and \( x_i \) is her cost share. The cost function is chosen to be \( C(q) = q^c, \) where \( c = 0.5, 1 \) and \( 2. \) Varying parameters \( b \) and \( c \) will give us nine combinations of concave, linear and convex utility and cost functions. Note that \( b = 1 \) and \( c = 2 \) is the original experimental design.

6 Conclusion

Cost sharing mechanisms have many practical applications in the real world. An increasingly important area is distributed systems like the Internet, where agents have very limited information about the payoff structure as well as the characteristics of other agents and where there is no synchronization of actions. Most current Internet routers use the average cost pricing mechanism, while this study suggests that the serial mechanism might be a better choice. Similarly, in the allocation of men to training schools in the Navy, different units may experience long waiting times and demands must be rationed. This study suggests that a more efficient allocation of waiting times could be done by using the serial mechanism rather than more traditional approaches such as first-in-first-out algorithm.

This paper reports experimental results on the serial and the average cost pricing mechanisms under three different treatments. The first is a complete information treatment designed to test the basic properties of the mechanisms. The other two treatments simulate distributed systems by giving the subjects very limited information about the game and with different degree of matching stability. The latter present a more challenging and realistic setting for the cost sharing mechanisms.

Experimental results show that the serial mechanism performs significantly better than the average cost pricing mechanism in all treatments both in terms of efficiency and predictability measured as frequency of equilibrium play.

References

cite

Aadland, David and Van Kolpin. “Shared Irrigation Costs: An Empirical and Axiomatic Analysis.” Mathematical


Milgrom, Paul and John Roberts. “Rationalizability, Learning and Equilibrium in Games with Strategic Complementarities.” *Econometrica* 58, no. 6 (1990): 1255-1277.


APPENDIX A. EXPERIMENT INSTRUCTIONS

Instruction for Mechanism S corresponds to the serial mechanism under complete information. Instruction for Mechanism A corresponds to the average cost pricing mechanism under complete information. Introduction, Procedure and Computer instructions for Mechanism A are identical to that of Mechanism S and hence are omitted. Instruction for Mechanism XY is for both mechanisms under limited information.

Experiment Instructions – Mechanism S

Name ___________ PCLAB ___ Total Payment _____

Introduction

- You are about to participate in a decision process in which one of numerous alternatives is selected in each of 50 rounds. This is part of a study intended to provide insights into certain features of decision processes. If you follow the instructions carefully and make good decisions you may earn a considerable amount of money. You will be paid in cash at the end of the experiment.

- During the experiment, we ask that you please do not talk to each other. If you have a question, please raise your hand and an experimenter will assist you.

Procedure

- At the beginning of the experiment you will be randomly assigned to one of four types: the Blue type, the Green type, the Red type, or the Yellow type. There will be 3 participants of each type. You will keep your type for the entire experiment.

- In each of 50 rounds, you will be randomly matched into different groups. Each group consists of four participants - a Blue, a Green, a Red and a Yellow type. You will not know the identities of the other participants in your group. Your payoff each round depends only on the decisions made by you and the other participants within your group.

- In each of 50 rounds, each participant will demand a quantity, which will give you some benefit. The total quantity within each group will be produced and the cost of production will be shared among all four members of the group. The benefit and cost allocation method will be explained below.
Payoffs

- **Per Round Benefit:** Each unit you demand will give you some benefit.

  \[
  \begin{align*}
  \text{Blue's Benefit} & = (48 \times \text{Blue's Quantity}) + 60 \\
  \text{Green's Benefit} & = (54 \times \text{Green's Quantity}) + 20 \\
  \text{Red's Benefit} & = 58 \times \text{Red's Quantity} \\
  \text{Yellow's Benefit} & = 60 \times \text{Yellow's Quantity}
  \end{align*}
  \]

- **Per Round Cost:** Your cost share depends on your quantity as well as the quantities demanded by others in your group that are lower than yours. We order the quantities demanded from the lowest to the highest: \( Q_1 \leq Q_2 \leq Q_3 \leq Q_4 \). The total cost of producing all demanded quantities is the sum of all quantities squared, \((Q_1 + Q_2 + Q_3 + Q_4)^2\). The total cost is distributed to the four participants in the following way.

  - If you demand a quantity which is the smallest in your group, \( Q_1 \), your cost share only depends on your own quantity, i.e.,
    \[
    C_1 = \frac{(4Q_1)^2}{4} = 4Q_1^2.
    \]
    Therefore, you pay one fourth of the cost of producing four times the smallest quantity.

  - If your demand is \( Q_2 \), your cost share is
    \[
    C_2 = C_1 + \frac{(Q_1 + 3Q_2)^2 - (4Q_1)^2}{3}.
    \]
    Therefore, you pay the cost share of the smallest demander, plus one third of the additional cost of producing the smallest quantity and three times your own quantity.

  - If your demand is \( Q_3 \), your cost share is
    \[
    C_3 = C_2 + \frac{(Q_1 + Q_2 + 2Q_3)^2 - (Q_1 + 3Q_2)^2}{2}.
    \]
    Therefore, you pay the cost shares of the second smallest demander, plus half of the additional cost of producing \( Q_1 + Q_2 + 2Q_3 \).

  - If you demand the highest quantity in your group, \( Q_4 \), you pay the rest of the cost:
    \[
    C_4 = C_3 + [(Q_1 + Q_2 + Q_3 + Q_4)^2 - (Q_1 + Q_2 + 2Q_3)^2].
    \]
    Therefore, the more you demand, the more cost you have to pay. Your cost share is only affected by your own demand, and those whose demands are lower than yours. Your cost share is independent of demands higher than your own.
Per Round Payoff = Per Round Benefit - Per Round Cost

Table 1 displays per round payoffs, which summarize both the benefit and the cost, for different types of participants, if that participant’s demand is the lowest in his/her group. Payoff tables for participants whose demands are not the smallest are somewhat cumbersome, and thus not displayed.

- There will be 50 rounds. There will be no practice rounds. From the first round, you will be paid for each decision you make.
- Your total payoff is the sum of your payoffs in all rounds.
- The exchange rate is $1 for ___________ points.

**Information** At the end of each round, you are informed of all results for the round:

- The demands of each participant in each group; and
- The corresponding payoffs of each participant in each group.

We encourage you to earn as much cash as you can. Are there any questions?

**Review Questions**

1. You are a ____ (Blue, Green, Red, Yellow) type.

2. If you demand a quantity of 17 and your demand is the lowest in your group, your payoff will be _____. (Check Table 1.)

3. If the smallest quantity in your group is \( Q_1 = 3 \), and your demand is the second smallest, \( Q_2 = 10 \), then
   - your benefit = ____;
   - your cost = \( 4Q_1^2 + \frac{(Q_1+3Q_2)^2-(4Q_1)^2}{3} = ____ \); and
   - your payoff = your benefit - your cost = ____.

4. True or false:
   - (a) ____ You will keep your type for the entire experiment.
   - (b) ____ You will be playing with the same three participants for the entire experiment.
   - (c) ____ Your payoff depends only on your own quantity.

**Computer Instructions**

**Process**
At the beginning of each round, you enter your Quantity, and then click the Okay button to submit it.

You are free to enter any integer between 0 and 20.

Notice that if you enter a Quantity outside of 0 and 20, or do not enter an integer, the computer will tell you that your Quantity is not valid and you need to change your selection.

After all participants have submitted a Quantity, the computer will calculate your payoff and send this number and other relevant information to your screen.

This process will be repeated for each round.

Changing Your Entry

Prior to clicking the Okay button, use the Back Space key to delete your selection, and then enter your new selection.

Once you have submitted your Quantity, you cannot change it.

History Box

At any point in the experiment, you can review all of your previous choices and payoffs by reviewing the History box.

To make a choice.

To view rounds that are not visible, use the scroll bar on the right of the History box.

Experiment Instructions – Mechanism A

Name __________ PCLAB ___ Total Payment ______

... ...

Payoffs

Per Round Benefit: Each unit you demand will give you some benefit.

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{Blue's Benefit} &= (48 \times \text{Blue's Quantity}) + 180 \\
\text{Green's Benefit} &= (54 \times \text{Green's Quantity}) + 102 \\
\text{Red's Benefit} &= 58 \times \text{Red's Quantity} \\
\text{Yellow's Benefit} &= 60 \times \text{Yellow's Quantity}
\end{align*}
\]
• **Per Round Cost**: Your cost share depends on your quantity as well as the quantities demanded by others in your group. Cost of producing $x$ units is $x^2$. Your share of the cost is proportional to your demand. Therefore,

$$\text{Your Cost Share} = \frac{\text{Your Quantity}}{\text{Total Quantity}} \times (\text{Total Quantity})^2$$

$$= (\text{Your Quantity}) \times (\text{Total Quantity}), \text{where}$$

Total Quantity = Your Quantity + Sum of Other Three Participants’ Quantities.

Therefore, the more you demand, the more cost you have to pay. Your cost share is proportional to your quantity.

• **Per Round Payoff = Per Round Benefit - Per Round Cost**

Tables 1 - 4 display per round payoffs, which summarize both the benefit and the cost, for each type of participants. The first column is your quantity (from 0 to 20). The first row is the sum of the other three participants’ quantities (from 0 to 60, with a step size of 2). The numbers in the table are your payoffs corresponding to each combination of your quantity and the sum of others’ quantities.

• There will be 50 rounds. There will be no practice rounds. From the first round, you will be paid for each decision you make.

• Your total payoff is the sum of your payoffs in all rounds.

• The exchange rate is $1 for ___________ points.

**Information** At the end of each round, you are informed of all results for the round:

• The demands of each participant in each group; and

• The corresponding payoffs of each participant in each group.

We encourage you to earn as much cash as you can. Are there any questions?

**Review Questions**

1. You are a ____ (Blue, Green, Red, Yellow) type.

2. If you demand a quantity of 17 and the sum of the others quantities is 20, your payoff will be ____.
   (Check Tables 1 - 4, ONE of which is your payoff table.)

3. True or false:
   (a) ____ You will keep your type for the entire experiment.
(b) You will be playing with the same three participants for the entire experiment.
(c) Your payoff depends only on your own quantity.

**Experiment Instructions – Mechanism XY**

PCLAB  Total Payment

**Procedure**
- You are part of a game, in which you have to make a decision in each of 50 rounds.
- In each round, you are free to enter any integer between 0 and 20.

**Information**
- At the end of each round, you are informed of your result for the round:
  - your own choice
  - your own payoff

**Total Payoffs**
- Your total payoff is the sum of your payoffs in all rounds.
- The exchange rate is $1 for ___ points.

We encourage you to earn as much cash as you can. Are there any questions?

**Computer Instructions**

**Process**
- At the beginning of each round, you enter your Choice, and then click the Okay button to submit it.
- You are free to enter any integer between 0 and 20.
- Notice that if you enter a Choice outside of 0 and 20, or do not enter an integer, the computer will tell you that your Choice is not valid and you need to change your selection.
- After all participants have submitted a Choice, the computer will calculate your payoff and send this number and other relevant information to your screen.
- This process will be repeated for each round.

**Changing Your Entry**
- Prior to clicking the Okay button, use the Back Space key to delete your selection, and then enter your new selection.
- Once you have submitted your Choice, you cannot change it.

**History Box**

23
• At any point in the experiment, you can review all of your previous choices and payoffs by reviewing the **History** box.

  to make a choice.

• To view rounds that are not visible, use the scroll bar on the right of the **History** box.
APPENDIX B. Discretization and Multiple Equilibria in ACP

Proof of Proposition 1: Let \( \{q_i^*\} \) be the Nash equilibrium quantities of the ACP game with a continuous strategy space. With a quadratic cost function, \( C(\sum_i q_i) \), the unique Nash equilibrium is characterized by the solution to the following maximization problem:

\[
\max_{\bar{q}_i} \alpha_i q_i - \frac{q_i}{\sum_j q_j} (\sum_j q_j)^2.
\]

The first order condition is \( \alpha_i - \sum_j q_j - q_i = 0 \). Summing over \( i \), we get \( \sum_i q_i = \sum_i \alpha_i/(n+1) \). Therefore,

\[
q_i^* = \alpha_i - \frac{\sum_j \alpha_j}{n+1}, \quad \sum_i q_i^* = \frac{\sum_i \alpha_i}{n+1}, \quad \text{and} \quad \pi_i^* = (q_i^*)^2.
\]

To prove that \( \{\bar{q}_1, \cdots, \bar{q}_n|\bar{q}_i \in \{q_i^* - s, q_i^* + s\} \text{ and } \sum_i \bar{q}_i = \sum_i q_i^* \} \) are all Nash equilibria of the discrete game, we need to show that unilateral defection by any player does not improve her payoff. In equilibrium

\[
\bar{\pi}_i(\bar{q}) = \alpha_i \bar{q}_i - \bar{q}_i \sum_j \bar{q}_j = \alpha_i \bar{q}_i - \bar{q}_i \sum_j \bar{q}_j^* = \bar{q}_i(\alpha_i - \frac{\sum_i \alpha_i}{n+1}) = \bar{q}_i q_i^*.
\]

Case 1. \( \bar{q}_i = q_i^* - s \). In this case \( \bar{\pi}_i(\bar{q}) = (q_i^* - s)q_i^* \).

If player \( i \) unilaterally defects to strategy \( q_i = q_i^* - m \equiv \bar{q}_i + s - m \), where \( m \in D \) and \( m \neq s \),

\[
\pi_i(q_i, q_{-i}) = \pi_i(q_i^* - m) (\alpha_i - (\sum_j q_j^* + s - m)) = (q_i^* - m)(q_i^* + m - s) = (q_i^* - s)q_i^* - m(m-s) \leq (q_i^* - s)q_i^*,
\]

since \( m(m-s) \geq 0 \) for \( m \in D \).

Case 2. \( \bar{q}_i = q_i^* \). In this case \( \bar{\pi}_i(\bar{q}) = (q_i^*)^2 \).

If player \( i \) unilaterally defects to strategy \( q_i = q_i^* + m \equiv \bar{q}_i + m \), where \( m \in D \) and \( m \neq s \),

\[
\pi_i(q_i, q_{-i}) = \pi_i(q_i^* + m) (\alpha_i - (\sum_j q_j^* + m)) = (q_i^* + m)(q_i^* + m - s) = (q_i^* + s)q_i^* - m(m-s) \leq (q_i^* + s)q_i^*,
\]

since \( m(m-s) \geq 0 \) for \( m \in D \).

Therefore, \( \{\bar{q}_1, \cdots, \bar{q}_n|\bar{q}_i \in \{q_i^* - s, q_i^* + s\} \text{ and } \sum_i \bar{q}_i = \sum_i q_i^* \} \) are all Nash equilibria of the discrete game.

Let \( \bar{q}_1 \leq \bar{q}_2 \leq \cdots \leq \bar{q}_n \). Let \( \bar{q}_i = q_i^* + s_i \), where \( s_i = -s, 0 \) or \( s \) and \( \sum_i s_i = 0 \). The aggregate payoffs in equilibrium is

\[
\sum_i\pi_i(\bar{q}_i) = \sum_i \bar{q}_i q_i^* = \sum_i (q_i^*)^2 + \sum_i s_i q_i^*.
\]
### Table 1: Parameters, Equilibrium Quantities and Payoffs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ID</th>
<th>Label</th>
<th>Parameters</th>
<th>Equil. Quantities</th>
<th>Equil. Payoffs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>$\alpha_i$ $\omega_i^s$ $\omega_i^a$</td>
<td>$q_i^s$ $q_i^a$</td>
<td>$\pi_i^s$ $\pi_i^a$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>(Blue)</td>
<td>48 60 180</td>
<td>6 {3, 4, 5}</td>
<td>204 196</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>(Green)</td>
<td>54 20 102</td>
<td>7 {9, 10, 11}</td>
<td>203 202</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>(Red)</td>
<td>58 20 102</td>
<td>8 {13, 14, 15}</td>
<td>213 196</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>(Yellow)</td>
<td>60 0 0</td>
<td>9 {15, 16, 17}</td>
<td>230 256</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td>220 80 282</td>
<td>30 44</td>
<td>850 850</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: bold-faced quantities and payoffs are Nash equilibrium quantities and payoffs with a continuous strategy space. For ACP all Nash equilibrium quantities add up to 44.

### Table 2: Multiple Equilibrium Quantities and Payoffs in ACP

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number</th>
<th>$q_1^a$ $q_2^a$ $q_3^a$ $q_4^a$</th>
<th>$\pi_1^a$ $\pi_2^a$ $\pi_3^a$ $\pi_4^a$</th>
<th>$\sum_i \pi_i^a$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>3 9 15 17</td>
<td>192 192 210 272</td>
<td>866</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>3 10 14 17</td>
<td>192 202 196 272</td>
<td>862</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>3 10 15 16</td>
<td>192 202 210 256</td>
<td>860</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>3 11 13 17</td>
<td>192 212 182 272</td>
<td>858</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>3 11 14 16</td>
<td>192 212 196 256</td>
<td>856</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>3 11 15 15</td>
<td>192 212 210 240</td>
<td>854</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>4 9 14 17</td>
<td>196 192 196 272</td>
<td>856</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>4 9 15 16</td>
<td>196 192 210 256</td>
<td>854</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>4 10 13 17</td>
<td>196 202 182 272</td>
<td>852</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>4 10 14 16</td>
<td>196 202 196 256</td>
<td>850</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>4 10 15 15</td>
<td>196 202 210 240</td>
<td>848</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>4 11 13 16</td>
<td>196 212 182 256</td>
<td>846</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>4 11 14 15</td>
<td>196 212 196 240</td>
<td>844</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>5 9 13 17</td>
<td>200 192 182 272</td>
<td>846</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>5 9 14 16</td>
<td>200 192 196 256</td>
<td>844</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>5 9 15 15</td>
<td>200 192 210 240</td>
<td>842</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>5 10 13 16</td>
<td>200 202 182 256</td>
<td>840</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>5 10 14 15</td>
<td>200 202 196 240</td>
<td>838</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>5 11 13 15</td>
<td>200 212 182 240</td>
<td>834</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2: Multiple Equilibrium Quantities and Payoffs in ACP.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Session</th>
<th>Complete Information</th>
<th>Limited Information</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SRL(_c)</td>
<td>ACP(_c)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>010711</td>
<td>010711</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>010713</td>
<td>010813</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>010719</td>
<td>010814</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>010723</td>
<td>010816</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>010802</td>
<td>010823</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3: Features and Dates (year month date) of Experimental Sessions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Information</th>
<th>Complete</th>
<th>Limited</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Session</td>
<td>SRL(_c)</td>
<td>ACP(_c)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.850</td>
<td>0.584</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.861</td>
<td>0.614</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>0.852</td>
<td>0.613</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>0.840</td>
<td>0.636</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>0.871</td>
<td>0.662</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4: Efficiency of Each Session

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Information</th>
<th>Complete</th>
<th>Limited</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Session</td>
<td>SRL(_c)</td>
<td>ACP(_c)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.629</td>
<td>0.215</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.418</td>
<td>0.228</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>0.405</td>
<td>0.263</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>0.440</td>
<td>0.197</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>0.583</td>
<td>0.265</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5: Proportion of Equilibrium Play for Each Session
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>SRL</th>
<th>ACP</th>
<th>Complete Info.</th>
<th>Limited Info.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ln(Period)</td>
<td>-1.0376</td>
<td>-1.0225</td>
<td>-0.4997</td>
<td>-0.7581</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0357)***</td>
<td>(0.0429)***</td>
<td>(0.0395)***</td>
<td>(0.0570)***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DummyI × ln(Period)</td>
<td>-0.0301</td>
<td>-0.2110</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0468)</td>
<td>(0.0619)***</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DummyM × ln(Period)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.2726</td>
<td>-0.5195</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0469)***</td>
<td>(0.0604)***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>5.1161</td>
<td>5.1159</td>
<td>3.8278</td>
<td>6.5111</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.1650)***</td>
<td>(0.1444)***</td>
<td>(0.1433)***</td>
<td>(0.1886)***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>5988</td>
<td>5988</td>
<td>5988</td>
<td>6000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of groups</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>120</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Notes:**
1. Random-effects GLS regressions.
2. Standard errors in parentheses.
3. DummyI is a dummy variable for the information conditions, while DummyM is a dummy variable for the mechanisms.
4. Significant at: *** 1% level.

Table 6: Speed of Convergence
## Table 7: Speed of Convergence by Type

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Session</th>
<th>ACP&lt;sub&gt;c&lt;/sub&gt;</th>
<th>ACP&lt;sub&gt;t&lt;/sub&gt;</th>
<th>SRL&lt;sub&gt;c&lt;/sub&gt;</th>
<th>SRL&lt;sub&gt;t&lt;/sub&gt;</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.92</td>
<td>0.93</td>
<td>0.79</td>
<td>0.87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.93</td>
<td>0.92</td>
<td>0.75</td>
<td>0.90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Session Level</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0.92</td>
<td>0.92</td>
<td>0.80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MSD</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0.92</td>
<td>0.93</td>
<td>0.80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0.92</td>
<td>0.92</td>
<td>0.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overall MSD</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.92</td>
<td>0.93</td>
<td>0.79</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Estimated Parameters | α | r   | 2 | 0.90 | 0.90 | 0.70 | 0.90 |

### Table 8: Calibration of the Payoff Assessment Model